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5Executive Summary
For more than three decades, the United States has been a global leader in the fight 
against corruption. The passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 
drew a line in the sand: a culture of corruption was incompatible with sound interna-
tional business practice. In the years since, largely at the behest of the United States, 
dozens of leading trading partners have adopted domestic legislation criminalizing cor-
rupt foreign business practices in conformity with a number of multilateral treaties 
setting global anti-corruption standards. Through the globalization of anti-corruption 
regulation, the effort begun in 1977 to achieve a global business environment based on 
business merit and not bribes is finally coming to fruition. Support for good governance 
and the elimination of corruption has brought citizens to the streets in country after 
country. At no time since the passage of the FCPA has global support for the elimination 
of corrupt business practice been as strong. This is not the time to turn back.
Unfortunately, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce now proposes to do just that. 
In its brief Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(2010), the Chamber proposes to change the Act in ways that would substantially under-
mine the possibility for successful enforcement of America’s anti-bribery commitments. 
The Chamber’s proposed amendments would also set back decades of progress in the 
global struggle against corruption. Since the adoption of the FCPA, many countries 
and international organizations have adopted similar regulations, such as the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development Anti-Bribery Convention, and national laws spreading across the 
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globe from Europe to Russia to China. By weakening the FCPA, the U.S. would send 
a signal to these entities that our commitment to combatting corruption has wavered, 
potentially stalling this global momentum.
The Chamber justifies its proposals as modest requests to protect American busi-
ness from prosecutorial overreach. In fact, FCPA prosecutorial overreach by the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) is a myth. While the number of FCPA enforcement actions has 
increased, the average amount of fines obtained from corporate offenders has remained 
largely consistent and modest.1 The private sector is responsible for the most significant 
implementation of FCPA requirements and compliance remains the goal of criminal 
investigation and enforcement at every stage.2 Moreover, DOJ enforcement has not 
singled out American companies—indeed, as the Chamber Report recognized, the DOJ 
has sought to ensure a level playing field for American business by diligent enforcement 
of the FCPA in respect of foreign companies.3 In addition, the Chamber’s proposals 
would needlessly hamstring what has been a judicious and increasingly effective use 
of prosecutorial discretion to encourage compliance and isolate the most egregious 
violations. 
• Often seen as the least concerning of the Chamber’s proposals, the creation of 
an affirmative defense of “compliance” to FCPA corporate criminal liability is 
actually potentially very dangerous. Compliance is already taken into account at 
every stage in the investigation and resolution of FCPA violations. In 1988, Con-
gress amended the FCPA to eliminate liability based on a company’s failure to 
eliminate bribery which it had “reason to know” was taking place. A defense of 
“adequate” or “good faith” compliance makes no sense when, as under the cur-
rent FCPA, corporate criminal liability requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the company acted with actual knowledge and corrupt intent to influence a 
foreign government to gain an improper business advantage. Creating a compli-
ance defense to knowing and intentional violations of the FCPA would amount to 
eliminating criminal liability under the Act all together by permitting a “fig leaf” 
compliance program to insulate companies from their knowing and intentional 
wrongdoing.
• Eliminating successor corporate criminal liability for an acquiror for violations 
undertaken prior to acquisition by an acquiree would result in perverse incen-
tives to avoid investigation of past FCPA violations by potential acquirees. Such 
a failure to investigate, while seeming to reduce acquisition costs in the short 
run, would likely expose the acquiring company to substantial unknown business 
risks and future enforcement where bribery remains undiscovered and therefore 
unaddressed. Even if rarely imposed, the potential for successor liability remains 
important to prevent companies from escaping from liability through restructur-
ing while preserving appropriate incentives for monitoring and compliance in the 
context of acquisitions.
• The Chamber asserts that it is necessary to add a “wilfullness” requirement to the 
mens rea standards for corporate criminal liability because of an alleged inequity 
with the standard applied for individual criminal liability. In fact, as interpreted 
and applied by the courts and the DOJ and the SEC, the applicable standards for 
criminal liability for both individuals and corporations are effectively equivalent. 
The Chamber’s intent appears to be to substantially reduce the scope of activity 
proscribed by the FCPA by absolving corporations of criminal responsibility for 
long-standing, pervasive, knowing and intentionally unlawful acts if they did not 
also have specific knowledge that their conduct was violating the FCPA. Seen 
in this light, the Chamber’s proposal looks much more like a license to commit 
pervasive and intentional bribery than a modest attempt to eliminate the risk of 
prosecutorial over-reach. 
• The Chamber’s proposed elimination of civil liability under the FCPA for the 
corrupt activities of subsidiaries would offer a formal escape route from enforce-
ment by elevating corporate form over substantive knowledge and intent while 
eliminating a significant incentive for parent companies to undertake appropriate 
oversight of the corrupt activity of their subsidiaries. Congress has long recog-
nized that parent companies frequently engage in foreign bribery through the use 
of subsidiaries and that eliminating the risk of liability would encourage a head-
in-the-sand management style of conscious disregard and deliberate ignorance to 
facilitate corrupt activity abroad. The Chamber’s arguments about the potential 
risk of prosecutorial over-reach are purely speculative. Eliminating the risk of civil 
liability, however, would substantially decrease the incentives for parent company 
to oversee FCPA compliance by their foreign subsidiaries and the effectiveness of 
the FCPA as a limit on corrupt corporate activity abroad.
• The Chamber’s effort to turn back the clock is most striking in the proposal to nar-
row the definition of “foreign official” at a time when the global trend is the other 
way—toward criminalizing bribery of both public officials and private actors. The 
Chamber’s proposed “clarifications” would seriously compromise the purposes 
of the FCPA to prevent intentional bribery in a world which organizes public 
authority in a wide variety of ways. Because the contours of public control over 
commercial life vary greatly in different contexts, legislative clarification would be 
destined to be both over and under inclusive. This is precisely the type of issue 
best left to sound administrative management and judicial review. 
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Contrary to the Chamber’s rhetoric, the global trends are toward increased inter-
national anti-corruption compliance, the FCPA is working as Congress intended and 
new legislation is neither necessary nor advisable. This is not the moment for the 
United States to abandon its decades-long leadership in the struggle to bend the cul-
ture of global business away from the scourge of corruption. Widespread corruption 
abroad imposes enormous costs on American business, damages the global business 
environment and undermines the integrity and effectiveness of governments. A culture 
of corruption raises the costs of penetrating foreign markets and undermines predict-
ability and business confidence.  It imposes particular hardships on small and medium 
sized American enterprises seeking to participate in the global economy. Fighting these 
obstacles to American business has required a long-term commitment by the U.S. 
government and by American companies to change the climate for global commercial 
activity and the culture of business-government relations in countries across the world. 
I. Introduction
1. The Challenge: Improving the Global Climate 
 for American Business
For more than three decades, the United States has been a global leader in the fight 
against corruption. Widespread corruption abroad imposes enormous costs on Ameri-
can business, damages the global business environment and undermines the integrity 
and effectiveness of governments. A culture of corruption raises the costs of penetrat-
ing foreign markets and undermines predictability and 
business confidence. It imposes particular hardships on 
small and medium sized American enterprises seek-
ing to participate in the global economy. Fighting these 
obstacles has required a long-term commitment by the 
U.S. government and by American companies to change 
the climate for global commercial activity and the culture 
of business-government relations in countries across 
the world. 
The most powerful buttress against corruption is 
the vigilance and determination of the private sector, for which participation in 
the global market should not come at the cost of business integrity. The business 
community has long recognized that it cannot fight corruption in the global economy 
A culture of corruption 
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without the support of government. Legal requirements in home jurisdictions establish 
a floor, giving business concrete justifications for resisting demands for corrupt pay-
ments. Moreover, multilateral collaboration among governments in standard setting 
and enforcement is necessary to change the global culture of corruption. A sound global 
business environment requires a level playing field to ensure that corrupt practices do 
not simply migrate to the most permissive location. Our diplomatic support for global 
anti-bribery standards strengthens foreign public authorities in their own efforts to end 
the culture of corruption.
 The passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 drew a line in the sand: 
a culture of corruption was incompatible with sound international business practice and 
an unacceptable basis for global economic growth.4 The FCPA represented an alliance 
between government and the American business community, driven by a shared rec-
ognition of the harms inflicted on American business by foreign corruption.5 The Act 
both raised the cost of corruption and encouraged sound business practice. By crimi-
nalizing the payment of bribes abroad, the FCPA strengthened the hand of American 
business in refusing the demands of corrupt foreign officials.6 By requiring that listed 
companies maintain records and file reports, the FCPA encouraged internal vigilance 
by leading business actors.7 
It was nevertheless clear from the start that victory over corruption would require 
more than a statute. It would require a long-term commitment to raise global standards, 
encourage private sector engagement and compliance, and support public sector reform 
in the developing world. In the years since passage of the FCPA, the struggle against 
bribery and corruption has been a shared project of Republicans and Democrats and a 
common project of American government and American business. It has also been a 
striking success for American diplomacy and multilateral engagement. 
Since passage of the FCPA, the American fight against corruption has devel-
oped in three phases: global standard setting, private sector compliance, and careful 
enforcement. The United States has worked diligently to create a level playing field 
for business by encouraging the adoption of national anti-corruption measures and 
multinational obligations to criminalize bribery and corruption. Over the last decade, 
governments across the world have strengthened national anti-corruption legislation, 
creating a transnational network of overlapping laws supporting the fight against cor-
ruption. Leading global businesses have risen to the challenge, strengthening their own 
internal management systems to ensure compliance and say no to corruption. Over the 
last years, the United States has increased its enforcement activity, focusing on the most 
egregious behavior and encouraging a culture of compliance by American and foreign 
business alike.
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2. A Legacy of Success: Global Standards, 
 Private Sector Compliance, Judicious Enforcement
The FCPA initiated a trend. In the years since its passage, dozens of leading trad-
ing partners have joined the United States in criminalizing corrupt foreign business 
practice.8 The United States has been a strong supporter of multilateral efforts to raise 
standards, most notably the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the UN Conven-
tion Against Corruption.9 These multilateral efforts have in turn sped the adoption 
of national statutes with functionally equivalent prohibi-
tions on corruption. It is noteworthy that several recent 
national statutes, including those in the United Kingdom 
and Italy, go beyond what the FCPA requires and hold 
business to stricter standards.10 American companies 
operating in the global economy today—like their coun-
terparts abroad—are subject to a dense fabric of anti-
corruption measures. 
As the legal playing field has leveled, the private 
sector has largely risen to the challenge. Encouraged by 
the requirements of many statutes, including the FCPA, 
many American companies have developed best practice routines of internal monitor-
ing and compliance, often reflected in enterprise wide “zero tolerance” policies. By 
developing a more robust culture of compliance, the private sector is transforming 
the culture of transnational business. The leading professional services firms routinely 
assist companies in monitoring and compliance.11 Moreover, collaboration between 
government and business has been critical to this record of success, particularly as 
mainstream American business has increasingly come to see the need for anti-bribery 
policies as protection for themselves as well as for developing nations.12 
Building on these successes, American and foreign authorities have gradually 
begun to strengthen their enforcement activities, focusing on individuals and entities 
which have not gotten the message that making corrupt payments to government offi-
cials to gain an unfair business advantage is no longer a permissible business prac-
tice in today’s global economy. The FCPA provides for civil and criminal enforcement 
authority by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of 
Justice (DOJ).13 For many years, criminal enforcement activity was modest. Indeed, from 
1977 until 2000, the SEC and the DOJ together averaged only three FCPA prosecutions 
a year with minimal, if any, penalties.14 
As best practice compliance initiatives became more widespread in the business 
community and other jurisdictions adopted parallel statutes, the DOJ strengthened its 
In the years since its 
passage, dozens of 
leading trading partners 
have joined the United 
States in criminalizing 
corrupt foreign business 
practices. 
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enforcement activity to target and isolate particularly bad 
actors and to encourage effective compliance.15 Sensible 
DOJ enforcement leading to compliance helps protect 
U.S. companies from prosecution abroad. The DOJ’s 
commitment to a level playing field for global business 
is clear: investigations have been brought against foreign 
and American entities.16 Indeed, the largest fines have 
been levied against foreign entities.17 
Top 10 FCPA Settlements
Rank Company Country Settlement Year
1 Siemens Germany $800 million 2008
2 KBR/Halliburton USA $579 million 2009
3 BAE UK $400 million 2010
4 Snamprogetti Netherlands 
B.V./ENI S.p.A
Holland/Italy $365 million 2010
5 Technip S.A. France $388 million 2010
6 JGC Corporation Japan $218.8 million 2011
7 Daimler AG Germany $185 million 2010
8 Alcatel-Lucent France $137 million 2010
9 Panalpina Switzerland $81.8 million 2010
10 Johnson & Johnson USA $70 million 2011
Source: The FCPA Blog Copyright © 2007 - 2011 by Richard L. Cassin and Cassin Law Publishing
Across the American legal system, it is routine for criminal enforcement to be 
targeted in such a way as to encourage compliance while focusing any punitive mea-
sures on the most egregious offenders. Resource management concerns affect all areas 
of criminal enforcement and it is now well understood that encouraging private sector 
compliance is the most cost effective way to reduce criminal activity in the business 
sector. In every field—from taxation and securities regulation to environmental protec-
tion—this requires the wise use of prosecutorial discretion coupled with careful guid-
ance to business about behavior that may trigger criminal sanction. The most effective 
The DOJ’s commitment 
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approach is precisely the one adopted by the DOJ in relation to the FCPA. The standards 
set forth in a criminal statute are given meaning in a changing business environment 
through case by case investigation which generates public guidance for industry against 
the background of judicial review. Guidance may come from administrative opinions, 
from the negotiated outcomes of successful investigations or from judicial opinions.18 
The DOJ stepped up enforcement through a careful balance of administrative 
guidance, prosecutorial discretion and negotiated settlement in the shadow of judicial 
review. As in other fields, the DOJ is coupling its investigations with use of Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) to encour-
age compliance rather than punish prior bad acts.19 This practice can be controversial 
because it runs the risk of letting entities off too easily and encourages a close working 
relationship between DOJ investigators and the targets of their investigations.20 In the 
FCPA context, it reflects a balanced judgment by the DOJ that compliance and self-
monitoring are ultimately the surest route to effective enforcement. 
This targeted enforcement activity is consistent with the letter and spirit of the 
1988 amendments to the FCPA by which Congress narrowed the basis for criminal 
liability to those who knowingly and corruptly make payments to foreign officials.21 The 
Congressional objective was clear. By eliminating criminal liability for those with only a 
“reason to know” that a bribe would be passed to a foreign official,22 Congress focused 
prosecutors on those individual or corporate persons who make bribes knowingly and 
with corrupt intent. Doing so focused FCPA criminal liability on the most culpable 
and encouraged effective compliance by business—compliance which actually prevents 
knowing and intentional violations of the Act. Where specific knowledge and intent 
cannot be proven, the Act provides no basis for criminal liability.
The anti-corruption world is changing rapidly. There is a great need for flexibility 
to deal with the range of institutional and cultural situations in the global economy, the 
rapidly changing forms corruption takes over time, and the diverse compliance risks 
faced by businesses of different sizes in different sectors. In this area, one size will not 
fit all. When standards are formalized at too high a level, they can become a barrier to 
entry for small and medium-sized enterprises. Legislating formal defenses can likewise 
set the bar too low, frustrating the clear Congressional intent to criminalize knowing 
and corrupt bribery abroad. Precisely at such a moment, we should encourage the DOJ 
and the SEC, in consultation with the business community, to move forward prudently 
with their enforcement activities subject to the tempering hand of judicial review. 
The United States has consistently provided leadership in setting standards and 
in developing the tools for robust voluntary compliance by the private sector in part 
through the wise exercise of prosecutorial discretion focused on leveling the global 
playing field.23 Strengthening the global culture of compliance requires a steady and 
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balanced collaboration between enterprise and government, identifying best practice, 
isolating bad actors, and aligning incentives for business and government to strengthen 
resistance to corruption in all its forms. The record of the DOJ is clear: investigation of 
violations by foreign and domestic businesses, negotiated resolution of investigations 
focused on effective compliance and a determination to prosecute the most egregious 
violators. Undertaken in the shadow of judicial review, FCPA enforcement has been 
notable for the very few instances in which companies have sought to appeal DOJ or 
SEC administrative action under the FCPA. The system is working precisely as Con-
gress intended. 
Dispelling the Myth of Excessive FCPA Enforcement
The recent increase in DOJ and SEC enforcement of the FCPA has been 
greatly exaggerated and in fact, emerges as appropriate in the context of 
the global fight on corruption. Recent enforcement has been tailored to 
encourage compliance while reserving penalties for only the most egregious 
corporate behavior. The DOJ has focused more directly on individuals mak-
ing corrupt payments than on corporate entities and has been as robust 
in addressing violations by foreign entities as by American corporations. 
Indeed, some of the largest fines have been levied against foreign violators. 
As multilateral obligations and national statutes have leveled the ground 
and private sector self-monitoring and compliance have increasingly become 
the norm, the DOJ has stepped up its enforcement activities. Placed in his-
torical and comparative context, the uptick in enforcement activity over the 
last years has been rather modest. The beginning of a concerted effort to 
increase FCPA enforcement—both in terms of the number of enforcement 
actions and the size of the penalties sought—emerged only in 2003, as 
international and national anticorruption statutes became common.
Despite the vocal criticism of the fines and penalties that have accom-
panied the uptick in prosecution, it is important to note that two-thirds 
of the fines collected in 2010 derived from just three matters. Although 
the number of FCPA prosecutions has risen since 2007, the average fine 
per corporate proceeding has remained quite stable over the last decade 
with the exception of two cases resulting in particularly large settlements. 
Focusing on the number of enforcement actions can also be misleading. 
Totals often reflect enforcement actions against affiliated companies aris-
ing from a single action—or instances in which the same company is sepa-
rately charged by the DOJ and SEC. Eliminating this double counting would 
reduce the number of corporate prosecutions initiated in 2010 from 47 to 20. 
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II. Three Decades of Multilateral 
 Collaboration
1. Global Consensus: The Costs of Corruption
When the FCPA was adopted in 1977, the costs of corruption were only beginning 
to be understood and appreciated. In many parts of the world, bribery was thought 
to be a routine cost of doing business. One occasionally heard that it could even 
increase economic efficiency by providing a simple way around complex and rigid 
bureaucracies. 
In the 1990s, an enormous scholarly literature emerged chronicling the eco-
nomic, political and cultural consequences of corruption.24 It became clear that corrup-
tion damages economic growth, reduces both domestic and foreign investment, slows 
business development and encourages the growth of an informal economy. Battling 
corruption became a priority for the leading international financial institutions and for 
the development community. The corrosive effects of corruption on the effectiveness 
and legitimacy of public authorities were understood to impede economic progress 
across the developing world. 
We now know that corruption wreaks havoc on economic growth and undermines 
the integrity and effectiveness of business and government alike. Corruption damages 
both developing and developed country economies, increasing costs and reducing the 
efficiency and stability of world markets.25 Today, American businesses recognize not 
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only the negative effects of corruption on both development and enterprise, but the role 
of the private sector in stopping the spread of bribery and corruption.26
Corruption remains the scourge of economic development.27 Corruption weakens 
governments by undermining the rule of law and public confidence in government 
institutions.28 Corruption siphons public expenditures away from important social ser-
vices such as health and education, reduces the produc-
tivity of public expenditures, and impedes governmental 
tax and tariff revenues.29 
Corruption also threatens the global business envi-
ronment.30 For businesses, the corrosive effects on mul-
tinationals and small to medium-sized enterprises alike 
are multi-faceted and complex. In addition to the direct 
cost of bribe payments, companies suffer reputational 
risk, the threat of extortion, increased cost of capital, 
distorted prices, unfair competition and decreased staff 
morale.31 In a corrupt environment, significant capital is expended in unproductive 
payments, resulting in financial loss to the company and significant lost development 
potential to the world. American business has learned that bribes “do not make good 
business sense.”32 Paying a bribe may provide a company with a particular service or set 
of goods, but the lack of a written contract leaves a company without a guarantee that 
the service will be performed or that the goods will in fact be awarded. In addition, the 
lack of record permits the possibility that in the next instance, the bribe amount could 
be raised.33 Corruption creates an uneven playing field for ethical actors, makes compa-
nies vulnerable to higher costs for transacting business, and represents a severe threat 
to corporate reputation.34 Failure to put in place active measures against corruption 
permits “employees and third parties to rationalize stealing from the company,” and 
the cost to a company of reputational damage due to revelations of corruption can be 
far higher than “merely” the financial cost of the immediate investigation. A company 
may lose shareholders, customers, and partners, as well as employees. Reputational loss 
may result in loss of business, if governments or civil society become suspicious of a 
company’s ethical track record.35 
These costs are difficult to calculate with confidence. We do know that for all 
the strides we have made in the fight against corruption, there is still a long way to 
go. Corruption remains endemic and American business continues to suffer its costs. 
According Daniel Kaufman, during his tenure as Director of Global Governance at the 
World Bank Institute, a “conservative approach” to measuring bribery of public sector 
actor by private sector entities yields an estimate of US $1 trillion annually in corrupt 
payments.36 Corrupt payments themselves, as Kaufman noted, represent only one part 
of the overall problem of corruption. Embezzlement, theft of public assets, and private 
Corruption weakens 
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sector bribery are also significant.37 The knock-on costs from lost efficiency, reputation 
and more are incalculable. 
Moreover, American companies participating in the global economy continue to 
perceive corruption as a significant obstacle to business.38 In a 2009 survey by account-
ing firm Ernst & Young, one in four respondents reported that their company had 
experienced an incident of bribery or corruption over the course of 2007 and 2008 
and 18% knew their company had lost business to a competitor who had paid a bribe.39 
Twenty-three percent of respondents “knew that someone in their company had been 
solicited to pay a bribe to win or retain business.”40 In a survey of more than 2,700 busi-
ness executives in twenty-six countries in 2008, Transparency International found that 
nearly forty percent of polled business executives had been asked to pay a bribe when 
working with public institutions, and fifty percent estimated that corruption increased 
their project costs by at least ten percent.41 Transparency International found that eighty 
percent of the 91,500 individuals they surveyed believe political parties are corrupt 
or extremely corrupt.42 Bribes paid to politicians and officials in developing countries 
approach $20 to $40 billion every year, which is a figure equivalent to forty percent of 
official development assistance.43 
In short, the challenges which led to the FCPA remain with us. Robust anti-
corruption efforts by business and government remain necessary. Unlike 1977, however, 
the network of legislation and the prospects for enforcement have expanded markedly, 
as has the compliance and self-monitoring practices of the business community. Prog-
ress is being made. 
2. Standard Setting: A Transnational Network 
 of National and Multilateral Anti-Corruption 
 Legislation
2.1  The First Step: The 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
The FCPA was adopted in part due to a scandal involving the aerospace company Lock-
heed bribing foreign officials to garner business and reflected widespread concern 
about the harmful effects of bribery and corruption by American companies operating 
abroad.44 The Senate statement accompanying the bill was unequivocal: “Corporate 
bribery is bad business.”45 In the ensuing years, the FCPA has twice been amended, 
most substantially in 1988, to sharpen its focus and align its requirements with multi-
lateral commitments.46 
So long as the FCPA was the only significant national statute criminalizing for-
eign corruption and applied only to U.S. domestic concerns and issuers subject to SEC 
2 0   T H R E E  D E C A D E S  O F  M U LT I L A T E R A L  C O L L A B O R A T I O N 
regulation, the playing field for participation in the global economy was not level. In 
1988, Congress directed the Executive Branch to encourage America’s most significant 
trading partners to enact similar legislation.47 The result was the OECD’s Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, signed by thirty-three states in 1997 
and ratified by the United States in 1998.48 As a consequence, the FCPA was again 
amended in 1998 to bring it into line with the requirements of the OECD convention.49 
The most significant changes extended jurisdiction to cover foreign nationals or foreign 
corporations who act in furtherance of a prohibited payment while in US territory and 
to provide for the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of the territoriality principle.50 
Taken together, the impact of these amendments is clear. The FCPA has been 
narrowed in focus and broadened in scope. On the one hand, only the most culpable 
are subject to criminal liability. The requirement that bribery be “knowing” narrows the 
FCPA relative to some other significant anti-bribery statutes, most notably the United 
Kingdom.51 At the same time, the jurisdictional reach of criminal enforcement was 
broadened to encompass foreign persons and entities when they act within the United 
States and to apply civil and criminal penalties to all employees or agents of U.S. busi-
nesses whether or not they are U.S. nationals.52 The resulting statute focuses enforce-
ment on egregious conduct while encouraging the use of criminal enforcement power 
to encourage non-corrupt business practices by U.S. and foreign companies alike and 
to ensure a level playing field for American business globally.53
2.2  Leveling the playing field: Multilateral Obligations and National Anti-Bribery 
  Statutes
U.S. leadership in the struggle against corruption has been remarkably successful in 
global standard setting. In 1977, the FCPA stood alone as a national law criminalizing 
bribery and corruption.54 The statutory situation today could not be more different. 
Multilateral conventions committing countries to join the fight against corruption have 
been widely signed and ratified. More than one hundred countries, including many of 
our closest allies and most important commercial competitors, have signed the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption, committing themselves to adopting imple-
menting legislation criminalizing bribery.55 
American leadership has been crucial. The FCPA has been a model for legisla-
tion elsewhere. Its existence has made it more difficult for opponents of anti-corruption 
legislation in other countries to argue that they would be placing their own firms at a 
competitive disadvantage. The American government has provided steady and critical 
support for multilateral efforts to set global standards prohibiting bribery and corrup-
tion. The success of these efforts is visible in the strength and breadth of multilateral 
commitments to criminalize bribery and corruption and in the number and stringency 
of the national statutes passed since 1977.
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The World Follows: Other Anti-Bribery Laws Passed after the FCPA
• Inter‐American Convention Against Corruption, 1997
• OECD Anti‐Bribery Convention, 1999
• Council of Europe Convention on Corruption (Criminal), 2002
• Council of Europe Convention on Corruption (Civil), 2003
• The UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), 2005
• African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 
2006
• UK Bribery Act, 2010 
• Russian Anti-Bribery Laws, amended 2011 
• Chinese Anti-Bribery Laws, amended 2011
American efforts to develop multilateral treaty commitments to fight corruption 
first bore fruit in the 1990s. The most significant achievement was the conclusion of the 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions (The OECD Convention) in 1997.56 A number of significant 
regional instruments were also concluded, including the Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption, which came into force in 1997.57 Thirty-eight countries are now 
parties to the OECD Convention which sets global standards for anti-corruption legis-
lation and commits signatories to passing domestic legislation that is the “functional 
equivalent” of that provided by its terms to ensure a harmonized playing field for global 
business.58 Crucially, the OECD Convention recognizes that good intentions and sound 
legislation are only the start. Defeating the culture of corruption requires an itera-
tive process of peer monitoring to assess compliance and make recommendations for 
improvement. All thirty-eight countries have now passed anti-bribery laws and con-
sented to OECD monitoring.59 The OECD Convention also provides for cooperation in 
investigations and proceedings and renders bribery an extraditable offense.
 Then-Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, Daniel K. 
Tarullo, credited several key trends supporting the State Department’s efforts to engen-
der multilateral anti-corruption commitments, including the growing views of econo-
mists with regard to the detrimental effects of corruption on economic development 
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and democratic accountability; louder calls by developing countries for industrialized 
nations to limit bribery by their companies; support by U.S. business for anti-bribery 
policies; and increasing intolerance for bribery among members of the public.60 
 In 2003, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) was 
signed, coming into force in 2005.61 UNCAC commits all signatories to adopting legis-
lation outlawing the bribery of foreign public officials.62 The UNCAC has a far broader 
range of signatories (140 developed and developing countries including China)63 and 
content than the OECD Convention, although its requirements are generally less strin-
gent in compelling harmonization. In addition to foreign bribery, UNCAC prohibits 
domestic bribery of public officials and recommends measures to prevent bribery in the 
public sector.64 It goes further than the FCPA in encouraging criminalization of both 
active and passive bribery.65 UNCAC has expansive provisions on mutual assistance in 
investigation and breaks new ground in global asset recovery.66
The State Department summarized the significance of these developments in 
2003 in these words: 
“Bribery and corruption tilt the playing field and create unfair advantages for 
those willing to engage in unethical or illegal behavior. Corrupt practices penalize 
companies that play fair and seek to win contracts through the quality and price 
of their products and services… Since [the enactment of the FCPA] the U.S. has 
been trying to level the playing field by encouraging other industrialized coun-
tries to take similar steps—and these efforts are finally paying off.”67
If it might once have been said that the FCPA threatened to place those subject to 
its terms at a competitive disadvantage, this is no longer the case. Often spurred by new 
multilateral commitments, dozens of countries, including our most important trading 
partners, have now passed anti-bribery statutes of their own.68 Moreover, Congress has 
narrowed and focused the FCPA through amendment. The result is a transnational 
regulatory framework which has leveled the legal playing field considerably while dis-
persing regulatory and prosecutorial exposure.
This global network of anti-bribery laws reflects a worldwide consensus that brib-
ery damages governments and business enterprises alike. It has changed the rules 
of the game for global commerce. In many ways, the flurry of recent national and 
international legislation reflects the success of the US campaign against bribery. As 
the US State Department has recognized, a global network of enforcement is the most 
efficacious and enduring way to combat corruption in an era of globalization.69 Global 
business today is subject to the anti-corruption rules of multiple jurisdictions and no 
company operating transnationally can ignore the possibilities for liability under a vari-
ety of statutes. As in other fields of legal regulation, companies engaging in global eco-
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nomic activity must ensure compliance and manage the risks of exposure to multiple 
overlapping regulatory requirements. 
Significantly, the American FCPA is no longer alone in criminalizing corrupt prac-
tices which occur outside American territory or which are committed by foreign indi-
viduals or business entities under some circumstances. The FCPA applies to all issuers 
listing with the SEC, to domestic concerns, regardless of where the violation takes place, 
and to foreign persons and companies whose activities have a link to or impact upon the 
American economy which “can be prosecuted for foreign bribery that has a connection 
to the US.”70 The extraterritorial character of the FCPA has been crucial in ensuring that 
the Act’s applicability does not prejudice American business. That other nations have 
joined us in extraterritorial enforcement has only contributed to this leveling effect. Many 
national statutes are silent on extraterritorial applicability, prohibiting bribery wherever 
it occurs, and relying on general rules of criminal procedure to determine the possibili-
ties for extraterritorial prosecution.71 Others explicitly authorize extraterritorial applica-
bility under various circumstances.72 The OECD Convention was cautious about the 
extraterritorial principle, although the OECD requirement of “functional equivalence” 
among anti-bribery statutes has permitted signatories, including the United States and 
the United Kingdom, to adopt explicit extraterritorial authorization for combating bribery 
and corruption.73 Perhaps most notably, the UK’s Bribery Act applies to acts taking place 
in whole or in part in the UK or committed by a UK national elsewhere, as well as mak-
ing any company that “carries on a business or part of a business” in the UK subject to 
prosecution for the offense of failing to prevent bribery, regardless of where the bribery 
itself took place.74 As a result, American corporations and citizens doing business abroad 
may be subject to the anti-corruption legislation of other OECD countries for corrupt 
activities both within the territory of such countries and elsewhere. 
Although the OECD and UN Conventions aimed to harmonize national anti-
bribery legislation, national statutes continue to differ, often in important ways. Several 
national statutes prohibit activities not addressed by the FCPA. As a result, our FCPA 
is no longer the most restrictive national statute. Indeed, the only point on which the 
FCPA is broader than the OECD Convention is its inclusion of corrupt payments made 
to candidates for office or to political parties.75 In many situations, American businesses 
are now subject to anti-corruption standards more extensive than those contained in the 
FCPA. In this respect, further reducing the scope of the FCPA would not reduce the 
need for internal monitoring and compliance measures for many American businesses 
operating transnationally. 
For example, unlike the FCPA, some more recent statutes, including that of the 
United Kingdom, prohibit receiving bribes (so-called “passive bribery”) as well as mak-
ing bribes.76 Some, again including the United Kingdom, criminalize bribery directed 
at private parties as well as public officials.77 The FCPA excludes so-called “facilitation” 
2 4   T H R E E  D E C A D E S  O F  M U LT I L A T E R A L  C O L L A B O R A T I O N 
payments (small payments for routine and non-discretionary government action) from 
scrutiny.78 Although this approach has been followed in some places,79 the UK has no 
such exception.80 The FCPA also creates an affirmative defense for “reasonable and 
bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses,” incurred by or on behalf of 
a foreign official and “directly related” to the “promotion, demonstration, or explanation 
of products or services” or “the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign 
government or agency thereof.”81 This defense has no parallel in the OECD Convention. 
The British statute also provides for no similar defense for hospitality or other bona 
fide expenses.82 In this area, the UK leaves a great deal of prosecutorial discretion in 
administering a legislative standard more restrictive than that of the FCPA. 
Most importantly, the United Kingdom and Italy reject the approach taken by 
Congress when it narrowed the FCPA to capture only those corrupt payments made 
knowingly. Both Britain and Italy establish offenses for individuals and entities which 
do not require knowledge.83 
In short, American leadership and multilateral standard setting work. The global 
playing field for business is being leveled. Businesses in the global economy are now 
subject to a variety of statutes prohibiting bribery and corruption. They differ in detail—
some stricter, some less so—but the mosaic of legislation increasingly makes clear 
that transnational economic actors are subject to anti-corruption virtually everywhere 
that they do business. A less corrupt global business environment means greater com-
petitiveness for American companies, easier access to global markets for small and 
medium-sized American companies and greater economic growth for all. 
As the progenitor of this global trend, the FCPA remains a robust example of the 
importance of standard setting and enforcement. It remains the crucial global bench-
mark for fighting corruption. How it is interpreted and enforced by American business 
and American government are as important to the global anti-corruption efforts now 
as its existence on the statute books was three decades ago. 
FCPA and Foreign Companies—Leveling the Playing Field
It is important to note that FCPA enforcement has not focused on American 
companies in ways which would put them at a disadvantage in the global 
economy. Reflecting the authorities’ commitment to leveling the playing field 
for transnational business, FCPA enforcement has increasingly focused on 
foreign entities. In 2010, the six largest penalties—accounting for 80% of 
the penalties collected—derived from matters involving non-U.S. corpora-
tions. Of the three largest penalties ever, two involved foreign enterprises. 
Of the twenty corporate matters brought in 2010, more than half involved 
non-U.S. companies, accounting for 94% of the penalties imposed in 2010. 
This emphasis on the activities of foreign companies belies the notion that 
increased FCPA enforcement has harmed U.S. companies relative to their 
foreign counterparts. Rather, careful enforcement by the United States 
against foreign and American business helps to establish a level playing 
field whose terms are guided by the best compliance practices of American 
business. 
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III. The Proposed Amendments: 
 A Radical Reversal of More than 
 30 years of U.S. Policy Promoting
 Fair Competition through a  
 Global Fight Against  Corruption
Under the misleadingly innocuous title “Restoring Balance,” the U.S. Chamber Insti-
tute for Legal Reform has proposed six far-reaching amendments to the FCPA that 
each would significantly reduce the scope and efficacy of the FCPA while substantially 
undermining more than 30 years of successful U.S. leadership in promoting global 
anti-corruption standards reflected in the adoption of the OECD Anti-Bribery Conven-
tion, the UN Convention Against Corruption and national legislation modeled on (and 
in some cases more stringent than) the FCPA by all of the OECD countries and a num-
ber of our most important non-OECD trading partners (including China, Russia and 
Brazil).84 At the very moment when U.S.-championed cries for a global level playing 
field based on competitive merit and corruption-free governance are sweeping the world 
on the streets of transitional countries and emerging democracies and in the legisla-
tures of all our major trading partners, Congressional action substantially weakening 
the FCPA would send a dangerous and destabilizing message to our trading partners, 
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foreign companies, foreign officials and emerging democratic movements around 
the world while undermining the crucial role the FCPA plays in helping U.S. com-
panies to resist demands for bribes abroad as the price of access to foreign markets 
and opportunities. 
In 1977, the FCPA was a ground-breaking and unique piece of legislation crafted 
in partnership with U.S. business to help promote competition-based market access 
by U.S. companies to foreign markets through the 
encouragement of a global business environment based 
on business merit and not bribes.85 Today, in large part 
due to the success of a strong 30-year commitment to 
anti-corruption by the U.S. government and U.S. busi-
nesses, the FCPA has become the model for the global 
proliferation of national anti-corruption legislation that 
attempts to reduce corrupt business practices while 
strengthening competition-based economic growth. In 
these circumstances, eroding the FCPA through limiting 
amendments would not reduce the need for U.S. compa-
nies to adopt bribery-free business practices and robust 
compliance and reporting mechanisms—in the current 
global regulatory environment, these are not just good global business practices, they 
are required by the laws of numerous foreign jurisdictions where U.S. companies are 
doing business. 
Adoption of the proposed amendments could, however, have the significant unin-
tended consequence of displacing U.S. leadership in the articulation of global anti-
corruption norms while centering anti-bribery enforcement action under the array of 
foreign legislation to which U.S. companies operating abroad would remain subject in 
the administrative agencies and courts of foreign trading partners. While the Chamber 
Report makes a number of speculative claims about the risks of potential abuse of 
enforcement discretion by the DOJ and the SEC under the FCPA, the Chamber Report 
presents no actual evidence that these agencies are not achieving an appropriate balance 
between using their FCPA investigatory authority to assist U.S. companies to improve 
global business practices and FCPA compliance, on the one hand, and prosecuting the 
most egregious violations of the Act on the other.
The bottom line is that the FCPA is working and the world has taken notice. 
Today, not only U.S. companies, but the companies of virtually all our major trad-
ing partners are subject to anti-bribery legislation modeled on (and sometimes more 
stringent than) the FCPA.86 The DOJ and the SEC have shown care and prudence in 
the enforcement of the FCPA and have pursued egregious violations of the Act by U.S. 
The FCPA has become 
the model for the global 
proliferation of national 
anti-corruption legislation 
that attempts to reduce 
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and foreign companies with equal vigor, creating no competitive disadvantage for U.S. 
companies.87 Through the judicious use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) 
and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), the DOJ and the SEC have helped numer-
ous companies ferret out corruption among employees while improving compliance 
practices and reducing the risk of non-compliance in the future. Moreover, helping U.S. 
companies to establish good global business practices in conformity with the FCPA also 
helps U.S. companies to reduce the risk of non-compliance under foreign anti-bribery 
legislation. 
In such circumstances, eroding the scope and efficacy of the FCPA by adopt-
ing the Chamber’s proposed amendments would be anything but “Restoring Balance”
—it would (i) needlessly introduce rigidity and uncertainty into the FCPA by disturbing 
established FCPA enforcement practices characterized by reasonableness and prudent 
flexibility based solely on chimerical fears of potential prosecutorial abuse and over-
reaching, (ii) undermine U.S. policy leadership in the global fight against corruption, 
and (iii) signal to the world a major reversal from the U.S.’s uncompromising commit-
ment to the global promotion of business practices and public institutions free from 
corruption. In fact, Congressional adoption of the Chamber’s proposed amendments to 
the FCPA would reflect a radical retreat in the global fight against corruption.
1. Proposed Amendment: Creating a Statutory 
 Compliance Defense
 Compliance is already taken into account at every stage 
in the investigation and resolution of FCPA violations
At first blush, the Chamber’s suggestion of adding a statutory compliance defense to 
the FCPA has some intuitive appeal. After all, as the Chamber’s Report acknowledges, 
both the DOJ and the SEC regularly take a company’s compliance efforts into account at 
every stage of the enforcement process, from undertaking a preliminary investigation, 
to deciding whether to pursue an indictment or enter into a DPA or NPA, to determin-
ing appropriate measures for bringing a company into compliance, to determining 
whether to impose fines or other sanctions for proven violations of the Act. If the DOJ 
and the SEC are taking compliance into account already, why not formalize that practice 
in the statutory language of the FCPA? 
The most direct answer is that an affirmative defense of “adequate” or “good 
faith” compliance is fundamentally inconsistent with the FCPA’s very high standards 
for corporate criminal liability which require prosecutors to prove that a company’s 
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prohibited acts be both “knowing” and “corruptly” undertaken with intent.88 The FCPA 
defines “knowing” as follows:
 (2) (A) A person’s state of mind is “knowing” with respect to conduct, a circum-
stance, or a result if—
   (i) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct, 
that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially 
certain to occur; or
   (ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that 
such result is substantially certain to occur.
  (B) When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required 
for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a 
high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person 
actually believes that such circumstance does not exist.89
While the term “corruptly” is not expressly defined in the Act, the DOJ has issued 
a public statement interpreting the term as follows: “The person making or authorizing 
the payment must have a corrupt intent, and the payment must be intended to induce 
the recipient to misuse his official position to direct business wrongfully to the payer 
or to any other person.”90 These standards of liability were summarized in the Congres-
sional Conference Report on the 1988 amendments to the Act:
Thus, the “knowing” standard adopted covers both prohibited actions that are 
taken with “actual knowledge” of intended results as well as other actions that, 
while falling short of what the law terms “positive knowledge,” nevertheless 
evidence a conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance of known circumstances that 
should reasonably alert one to the high probability of violations of the Act.91 
From these articulated and clearly-defined standards of corporate culpability under 
the FCPA, it becomes immediately apparent that an affirmative defense of “good faith” 
or “adequate” compliance is simply inappropriate. On the one hand, effective, “good 
faith” compliance is logically incompatible with the requirement under the Act that 
violations be undertaken with “actual knowledge” or “a conscious disregard or deliber-
ate ignorance of known circumstances” and the requisite “corrupt” intent to induce a 
foreign official to misuse his official position to wrongfully obtain business or direct 
business to another. Any compliance program that knowingly permitted, facilitated, or 
consciously or deliberately turned a blind eye to corrupt, intentional violations of the 
FCPA must be either per se inadequate or not undertaken in good faith. On the other 
hand, the existence of a merely formal compliance program is irrelevant to the question 
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of whether knowing, intentional and corrupt behavior 
took place. Creating a “compliance defense” to knowing 
and intentional violations of the Act would amount to 
eliminating criminal liability under the Act all together 
by permitting a “fig leaf” compliance program to insulate 
companies from knowing and intentional wrong-doing. 
The Chamber’s assertion that the existence of affir-
mative defenses for corporate compliance in the U.K. and 
Italian anti-bribery statutes creates a justification for the 
creation of an affirmative compliance defense under the 
FCPA is both inappropriate and misleading. With respect 
to the U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 (the “U.K. Act”), the affir-
mative defense of “adequate” compliance procedures is 
only available with respect to a new and very broad strict 
criminal liability offense created in the U.K. Act. In the 
U.K., a “commercial organization” may be held criminally liable for failure to prevent 
prohibited bribery by any person “who performs services” for such organization.92 In 
other words, under this provision of the U.K. Act, a company can be held liable for fail-
ure to prevent bribery conducted by employees or representatives without the company’s 
knowledge and without any corporate intent to make the bribes. No such offense exists 
under the FCPA, and the U.K. Act tellingly does not provide any affirmative defense 
of compliance for those offenses which include a mens rea requirement equivalent to 
the FCPA.93
Italian Legislative Decree No. 231 of 8 June 2001 (the “Italian Act”) creates admin-
istrative liability for companies resulting from offences committed by persons holding 
representative, administrative or managerial positions in the company so long as the 
criminal acts are in the interest of or otherwise benefit the company.94 Like the U.K. Act, 
there is no requirement in the Italian Act that the company have knowledge of the criminal 
activity or any intent to commit violations by its representatives in order to establish liabil-
ity.95 Article 6 of the Italian Act creates an affirmative defense for failure to prevent the 
criminal activity of an employee or representatives if the company can demonstrate that 
prior to the criminal activity the company had established and effectively implemented 
a compliance program suitable to preventing the corporate crime at issue and overseen 
by an autonomous supervisory body that adequately performed its duties.96 Thus, as 
with the U.K. Act, the compliance defense under the Italian Act is provided in respect 
to corporate administrative liability for a company’s failure to prevent criminal acts by 
its representatives whether or not it had knowledge of such acts or intended them to 
be undertaken.
Creating a “compliance 
defense” to knowing and 
intentional violations of 
the Act would amount 
to eliminating criminal 
liability under the Act all 
together by permitting 
a “fig leaf” compliance 
program to insulate 
companies from knowing 
and intentional wrong-
doing.
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The U.K. and Italian approaches might be reasonable as a matter of regulatory 
policy, allowing a company to avoid liability for its failure to prevent a particular instance 
of criminal activity by an employee or representative about which it lacked knowledge 
if the company can establish that it had in place an otherwise effective compliance pro-
gram adopted, implemented and administered in good faith. Despite the Chamber’s 
assertions to the contrary, there is no similar strict liability offense under the FCPA 
pursuant to which a company could be held responsible for acts of its employees or 
agents about which it had no knowledge or with respect to which it had not acted cor-
ruptly with “conscious disregard of known circumstances.” Since Congress eliminated 
corporate criminal liability for acts that a company “had reason to know” were unlawful 
in its 1988 amendments to the FCPA, the FCPA requires both knowledge and corrupt 
intent in order to hold a company liable for criminal acts by persons acting on the com-
pany’s behalf.97 As has been discussed already, an affirmative defense of “good faith” 
or “adequate” compliance is logically inconsistent with a liability standard that requires 
corporate violations to be both “knowing” and “corruptly” and intentionally undertaken. 
In this context, adopting the Chamber’s proposal to amend the FCPA to include an affir-
mative defense for corporate compliance in the face of knowing and intentional bribery 
would signal to our OECD partners a significant loosening of the applicable standards 
of conduct for corporations under the Act as well as a major shift in policy regarding 
the U.S. commitment to fighting global corruption.99 
The Chamber also suggests that companies will lack adequate incentives to imple-
ment appropriate compliance programs because of fear that the compliance program 
itself may subject them to liability under the FCPA without a formal statutory affirma-
tive defense for compliance. This concern is simply not supported by the facts. The 
obligation to put in place appropriate mechanisms to ensure adequate reporting up the 
chain of command and compliance with applicable law has its roots in the most basic 
requirements of corporate law—the fiduciary duty of managers to act in good faith and 
in the best interests of the corporation in the oversight of a company’s operations. The 
fundamental fiduciary duty of due care and oversight requires company management 
to adopt appropriate reporting mechanisms reasonably designed to bring malfeasance 
by employees and representative to light as well as compliance mechanisms designed to 
ensure compliance with the company’s legal obligations under applicable law.99 While 
a Board’s decision as to the type and scope of reporting and compliance mechanisms 
necessary in particular circumstances, if undertaken in good faith and in the absence 
of a [“systematic or conscious disregard for known circumstances”], will insulate the 
board from liability, the fiduciary obligation to adopt appropriate compliance measures 
remains a legal obligation of the corporate law of every state.100
This basic obligation to engage in good faith compliance is strengthened by the 
provisions of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines which set forth guidance for judges, pros-
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ecutors and companies with respect to corporate criminal liability and compliance, not 
only for the FCPA, but also for the numerous other federal statutes providing criminal 
sanctions for corporate acts. For example, the introductory comments to the section of 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual dealing with corporate crimes suggest that the 
Guidelines are designed to provide “incentives for organizations to maintain internal 
mechanisms for preventing, deterring, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.”101 
Under the Guidelines, a corporation’s criminal culpability and the possibility of sanction 
can be reduced by the existence of what the Guidelines call an “Effective Compliance 
and Ethics Program.”102 The Guidelines also define in significant detail the minimal 
requirements necessary to establish an “Effective Compliance and Ethics Program.”103 
While the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), deter-
mined that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were advisory and not binding on the courts, 
the Chamber has not put forth any evidence that either the DOJ or the federal courts 
are acting other than in conformity with the Guidelines in respect to the treatment of 
compliance efforts by companies in connection with FCPA investigations or prosecu-
tions. In fact, as has been noted elsewhere, and acknowledged by the Chamber Report, 
DOJ and SEC practice suggests that compliance is taken into account at every stage of 
the investigation and prosecution process under the FCPA, including decision to enter 
into DPAs and NPAs in appropriate circumstances.
Finally, in large part due to efforts of the United States in promoting anti-bribery 
legislation abroad, both U.S. and foreign companies are subject to anti-bribery statutes 
substantially equivalent to and in some cases more stringent than the FCPA in numer-
ous countries around the world in which they are doing business, including virtually 
all major trading partners. In other words, engaging in robust compliance practices is 
not a matter of business choice, such practices are an essential part of the requirements 
for doing business in the modern global economy.
In sum, appropriate reporting and compliance mechanisms are required as a mat-
ter of basic fiduciary duty, as part of the general obligation to comply with applicable law, 
as a significant method in accordance with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for reducing 
the risk of corporate criminal liability and sanction under federal law, and as an essential 
part of any effort to avoid criminal sanctions under the applicable anti-bribery laws of 
all OECD countries and most other major trading partners. Under such circumstances, 
it can hardly be said that the incentives to adopt adequate compliance mechanisms do 
not exist—good compliance practices are a necessary part of good global business.
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2. Proposed Amendment: Eliminating Successor 
 Liability for Pre-Acquisition Acts of an Acquired 
 Company under the FCPA
 Successor liability is rarely imposed, but it remains important to 
 prevent companies from escaping from liability through restructuring
Much of the rhetorical heat contained in the section of the Chamber’s Report dedicated 
to its proposal to eliminate successor liability for acquiring companies for the crimi-
nal acts of their acquirees is generated not from any issue peculiar to the FCPA, but 
rather from a strong ideological objection to successor liability in general. In describ-
ing the scope of its proposed amendment to the FCPA, the Chamber Report states: 
“At a minimum, a corporation, irrespective of whether or not it conducts reasonable 
due diligence prior to and/or immediately after an acquisition or merger, should not 
be held criminally liable for ... historical violations [committed by its acquiree(s)].”104 
While the imposition of successor criminal liability is indeed quite rare, the potential 
for successor corporate criminal liability in appropriate circumstances is by no means 
new or unique.105 Moreover, there are good policy reasons for retaining the possibility of 
successor criminal liability in cases where eliminating such liability would substantially 
undermine the purposes of the criminal statute in question, even if successor liability is 
rarely applied in fact.106 The FCPA is just such a case and the DOJ and SEC actions in 
the Alliance One case, described in the Chamber’s Report as an example of why succes-
sor liability is inappropriate, demonstrates precisely why successor liability is a crucial 
part of the FCPA enforcement framework.107 
In the Alliance One case, Dimon Incorporated (Dimon) and Standard Commercial 
Corporation (SCC), two independent wholesale leaf tobacco merchants, each acting 
through foreign subsidiaries, engaged in systematic and sustained schemes of bribery 
of foreign officials to obtain contracts for tobacco purchases for resale.108 In the case of 
Dimon, the bribery schemes lasted for a period of eight years in Kyrgyzstan and four 
years in Thailand.109 In the case of SCC, the bribery scheme was conducted over four 
years in Thailand.110 Both companies were also charged with numerous other FCPA 
violations for prohibited acts in a number of other countries including Greece, China 
and Indonesia.111 Evidence was proffered in the case of both companies that the brib-
ery schemes were undertaken by the subsidiaries at the direction of senior management 
at the parent company level.112 In 2005, Dimon and SCC merged to form Alliance One 
International, Inc. (Alliance One).113
Under the rule proposed by the Chamber, Alliance One could escape all liability 
for the knowing and intentional criminal acts of its predecessor companies (Dimon 
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and SCC) merely as a consequence of restructuring its corporate operations through 
a merger. This is not a case in which Alliance One sought to investigate or eliminate 
the criminal behavior of its predecessor companies after the merger. Nor was Alli-
ance One the innocent victim of the unauthorized acts of low level employees in its 
foreign subsidiaries. Yet, precluding the DOJ and the SEC from pursuing successor 
criminal liability after a restructuring as the Chamber urges Congress to do would 
have precluded the investigation and prosecution of egregious and long-standing FCPA 
violations by Alliance One and its predecessors, thereby significantly reducing the effec-
tiveness of the FCPA, while creating perverse incentives for companies to avoid liability 
through restructuring. It bears noting that even in the face of significant knowing and 
intentional violations of the FCPA by Alliance One as successor to Dimon and SCC, 
in addition to fines paid in connection with the guilty pleas of both subsidiaries and 
Alliance One, the DOJ also entered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement with Alliance 
One which focused on helping the company and its subsidiaries to improve internal 
compliance processes to reduce the risk of non-compliance in the future.114 Far from 
an example of prosecutorial over-reaching, the Alliance One case demonstrates that the 
current FCPA (including the availability of potential successor criminal liability) is an 
appropriate mechanism for punishing egregious and sustained bad acts from the past 
while creating an appropriate framework of incentives to encourage good corporate 
business practices for the future.
A similarly compelling case for successor criminal FCPA liability as an important 
mechanism for encouraging adequate pre-acquisition due diligence and post-acquisition 
compliance mechanisms can be made in the common circumstance where a potential 
acquiror is considering the acquisition of a company that may have engaged in FCPA 
violations. An excellent case in point is the one considered by the DOJ in its Opinion 
Release No. 08–02 (June 13, 2008) (hereinafter Halliburton case), which, like the Alli-
ance One case, generates considerable critical commentary in the Chamber’s Report.115
In the Halliburton case, Halliburton Company requested an opinion from the 
DOJ pursuant to the FCPA Opinion Release Procedure in a circumstance where it was 
engaged in competitive bidding for the acquisition of a U.K.-based company in the oil 
and gas industry that was traded on the London Stock Exchange and had operations in 
more than 50 countries, more than 4,000 employees and numerous national oil compa-
nies as customers (the Target).116 Due to peculiarities of U.K. law in competitive bidding 
situations, Halliburton had neither sufficient time nor sufficient access to information 
to complete its FCPA and anti-corruption due diligence on Target and it was precluded 
from making an offer conditional on the satisfactory completion of due diligence.117 In 
such circumstances, Halliburton sought assurance from the DOJ as to whether (i) it 
would be held liable under the FCPA for the acquisition of the Target, (ii) it would be 
liable for any FCPA liabilities of the Target prior to the acquisition and (iii) it would be 
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held liable for any post-acquisition conduct by the Target before it was able to complete 
its FCPA due diligence, if such conduct is identified and disclosed to the DOJ within 
180 days of the acquisition.118
In Opinion Release No. 08–02 the DOJ describes a comprehensive post-acqui-
sition plan of investigation, risk assessment, disclosure and cooperation put forward 
by Halliburton which indicates a significant, good faith effort to identify wrong-doing 
and to rectify it as soon as practicable, while also undertaking to create a new corpo-
rate culture of FCPA and anti-corruption compliance in the Target and throughout its 
operations.119 In response to Halliburton’s proposal, and recognizing that Halliburton 
was precluded by U.K. law from undertaking the due diligence it deemed appropriate 
prior to the acquisition, the DOJ opined that Halliburton would not be subject to FCPA 
successor liability (i) for merely acquiring the Target, (ii) for pre-acquisition conduct by 
the Target disclosed during the 180-day period following the closing, or (iii) for post-
acquisition conduct of the Target disclosed during the 180-day period following the clos-
ing, in the latter two instances, provided that Halliburton implemented its post-closing 
and remediation plan, and that no Halliburton employee or agent knowingly played a 
role in the violations by the Target.120
From the Halliburton case, one can see the crucial role that the potential for suc-
cessor FCPA liability plays in encouraging companies to engage in appropriate pre- and 
post-acquisition due diligence and compliance activities. The case also demonstrates the 
usefulness of the Opinion Procedure for obtaining guidance as to appropriate corporate 
behavior in the context of a complex multinational acquisition as well as the flexibility 
the DOJ has shown in helping companies to fashion appropriate due diligence, compli-
ance and risk management mechanisms without thwarting an otherwise advantageous 
acquisition.
To fully appreciate the benefits of successor FCPA liability, consider the perverse 
incentives for companies if successor liability were eliminated from the FCPA as pro-
posed by the Chamber. Because under the Chamber’s proposal an acquisition would 
immunize an acquiring company from liability for the criminal acts of the acquired 
company, companies like Halliburton might decide not investigate the past FCPA viola-
tions of potential acquirees. Such a failure to investigate, while seeming to reduce acqui-
sition costs in the short run, would likely expose the acquiring company to numerous 
unknown and potentially catastrophic business risks (especially if much of the acquired 
company’s business was procured by or relied upon bribes or corruption). In addition, 
the absence of a thorough pre-acquisition due diligence process may also significantly 
increase the risk of post-acquisition liability for the acquiring company under the FCPA 
(and other applicable foreign anti-bribery legislation) because without a clear picture 
of the corrupt practices of its acquiree at the time of the acquisition, the acquiring 
B U S T I N G  B R I B E R Y   3 7
company may fail to put in place necessary and appropriate reporting and compliance 
mechanisms to avoid future violations after the acquisition.
From this example, it becomes clear that adequate diligence both before and after 
an acquisition is not fundamentally about compliance with the FCPA, it’s about good 
business practice in a complex global business environment. Successor liability under 
the FCPA helps to prevent companies from seeking to avoid liability for their own past 
criminal behavior through corporate restructurings. At the same time, successor liabil-
ity provides an additional incentive for companies to engage in levels of diligence both 
before and after an acquisition sufficient to be sure that when they make an acquisition 
they are not acquiring much more business risk and potential liability than they bar-
gained for. It is also important to note that successor liability is a part of “best practice” 
anti-bribery legislation of our major trading partners, including the U.K. and Italy.121
In sum, far from evidencing a problem with the FCPA or DOJ or SEC practice 
with respect to successor liability, the resolution of the Alliance One case and the DOJ’s 
advice to Halliburton in Opinion Release No. 08–02 demonstrate that the system is 
functioning just as it was intended—providing appropriate mechanisms to prevent 
companies from escaping the consequences of criminal conduct through corporate 
restructuring, while at the same time providing incentives for companies to engage 
in appropriate levels of diligence both before and after acquisitions, thereby avoiding 
unnecessary and costly business and regulatory risk. Adopting the Chamber’s proposal 
to eliminate successor liability from the FCPA would disrupt this functional balance, 
while creating perverse incentives regarding due diligence and compliance that would 
neither serve the interests of U.S. business nor the purposes of the FCPA.
3. Proposed Amendment: Adding “Willfulness” 
 As interpreted and applied by the courts and the DOJ and the SEC, 
the applicable standards for criminal liability for both individuals 
and corporations are effectively equivalent
 
The Chamber’s proposal to add a “willfulness” requirement to establish corporate crimi-
nal liability under the FCPA is premised on an asserted unfairness in the legal treat-
ment of corporations as opposed to individuals under the Act. As the Chamber’s Report 
puts the argument:
The omission [of a willfulness requirement for corporations] substantially extends 
the scope of corporate criminal liability—as opposed to individual criminal 
liability—since it means that a company can face criminal penalties for a violation 
3 8   T H E  P R O P O S E D  A M E N D M E N T S
of the FCPA even if it (and its employees) did not know that its conduct was 
unlawful or even wrong.122
This is a misstatement of the mens rea requirements for corporate criminal liabil-
ity under the FCPA both as reflected the case law and in DOJ and SEC practice. As 
has been repeatedly stated, establishing corporate criminal liability under the FCPA 
requires prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the corporate defendant’s 
actions be both “knowing” and “corruptly” undertaken.123 The courts and the DOJ have 
interpreted “corruptly” to require that the defendant acted “knowingly and dishonestly, 
with the specific intent to achieve an unlawful result by influencing a foreign public 
official’s actions in one’s own favor.”124 Thus, the Chamber’s claim that corporations 
run the risk of criminal penalties under the FCPA of innocent, unknowing or mistaken 
violations of the Act is simply not accurate.
Moreover, the Chamber’s Report misstates the case law as to the legal meaning of 
the “willfulness” standard in the FCPA for individual defendants. In a long and carefully 
reasoned opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit in United States v. Kay 
articulated the meaning of the “willfulness” standard in the FCPA.125 In Kay, the Court 
begins its analysis of the “willfulness” requirement by recognizing that “willfulness” is 
not defined in the FCPA but derives rather from 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(2)(A) which defines 
the applicable civil and criminal penalties for a broad range of federal statutes.126 In the 
absence of a statutory definition for “willfulness” the court looks to the common law 
interpretation of the term following the structure of analysis established by the United 
States Supreme Court for analyzing criminal willfulness in federal statutes in Bryan v. 
United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998).127 Following Bryan, the court in Kay articulates three 
different levels of interpretation for criminal willfulness in federal law—the first (low-
est) level requires the defendant to have acted intentionally with knowledge of having 
committed an act which falls within the ambit of prohibited conduct under the appli-
cable statute regardless of whether the defendant knew of the existence of the statute or 
that the conduct was wrongful; the second (intermediate) level requires the defendant 
to have known that his actions were in some way unlawful regardless of whether the 
defendant knew of the specific statute prohibiting the conduct; and the third (strictest) 
level, found to apply only in very rare circumstances involving complex statutes like the 
tax code, requires the defendant to know the terms of the specific statute and that he 
was violating the statute.128 Following the Second Circuit, which had also considered the 
meaning of the “willfulness” requirement under the FCPA, and the Supreme Court’s 
logic in Bryan as to the rare circumstances in which the strictest “willfulness” standard 
should apply in connection with federal criminal statutes, the Kay court held that the 
FCPA was not a “complex” statute within the meaning of Bryan requiring the strictest 
standard of willfulness.129 Rather, the Kay court held that a jury instruction requiring the 
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jury to find that the “Defendants acted corruptly, with an ‘unlawful end or result,’ and 
committed ‘intentional’ and ‘knowing’ acts with a bad motive” was sufficient to establish 
the “willfulness” required for a criminal conviction of an individual under the FCPA.130
A comparison of the established interpretation of the “willfulness” requirement 
for individual criminal liability under the FCPA with the mens rea requirements of 
“knowing” and “corrupt” acts for corporate criminal liability under the Act reveals that 
the standards are effectively equivalent. Contrary to the Chamber’s suggestion, even 
absent a “willfulness” requirement for corporations, no parent company could be suc-
cessfully charged with criminal violations of the FCPA for unlawful payments made by 
a subsidiary about which it had no actual knowledge and with respect to which it did 
not manifest the requisite corrupt “bad or wrongful purpose and intent to influence a 
foreign official to misuse his official position.”131 
Conversely, adopting the “willfulness” standard that is currently applied under the 
FCPA to individuals for corporate criminal liability would not, as the Chamber suggests, 
protect a corporation from being “charged with violations of the anti-bribery provisions, 
even if it was unaware that the FCPA could reach such payments,”132 because the FCPA 
“willfulness” standard does not require defendants to have knowledge of and intent to 
violate the specific provisions of the FCPA, but only knowledge that making payments 
to a foreign official to influence the official’s actions is in some way unlawful.133 In 
fact, as interpreted and applied by the courts and the DOJ and the SEC, the applicable 
standards for criminal liability for both corporations and individuals under the FCPA 
require that the defendant knowingly engage in acts proscribed by the Act with the bad 
or wrongful purpose and intent that those acts would induce a foreign official to misuse 
his or her official position. Despite the Chamber’s claims to the contrary, these stan-
dards simply do not permit successful prosecution of innocent, mistaken or unknowing 
persons, whether corporations or individuals, under the FCPA.
From this analysis, the real impact of the Chamber’s proposal becomes clear—to 
raise the criminal liability standard for corporations and individuals under the FCPA to 
require defendants to know the specific provisions of the FCPA and to have the specific 
intent to violate those provisions. In other words, for the addition of a “willfulness” 
requirement to have the effect the Chamber desires, it would be necessary to raise the 
standard to the strictest level of criminal willfulness articulated in Bryan. In explaining 
the very rare circumstances in which federal law requires criminal defendants to have 
knowledge and intent to violate specific statutory provisions, the Court states:
[Those cases] involved highly technical statutes that presented the danger of 
ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct. As a result, 
we held that these statutes “carve out an exception to the traditional rule” that 
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ignorance of the law is no excuse and required the defendant to have knowledge 
of the law. The danger of convicting individuals engaged in apparently innocent 
activity that motivated our decisions [in those cases involving complex statutes] is 
not present here because the jury found that this petitioner knew that his conduct 
was unlawful.134 
The two federal circuits that have considered the question of whether the FCPA 
was a “complex statute” requiring the strictest “willfulness” standard have found that 
it is not, reasoning that the conduct proscribed under the FCPA—the knowing bribery 
of a foreign official with the bad or wrongful intention of inducing a foreign official to 
misuse his or her official position for advantage—was not the sort of highly technical 
prohibition that posed a significant risk of being innocently or inadvertently violated.135 
In other words, one doesn’t need to know the specific provisions of the FCPA to know 
that bribing a foreign official with the intent to obtain an unfair business advantage 
is wrongful and likely to be prohibited by some applicable law. This is the standard of 
“willfulness” that the courts and the DOJ/SEC have found is required by the FCPA for 
both individual and corporate criminal liability, and put in these clear terms, this stan-
dard presents no evidence of the extreme unfairness to corporations that the Chamber 
Report suggests.
Moreover, a brief examination of some of the cases that the Chamber Report 
cites in support of the alleged unfairness to corporations of the FCPA’s current mens 
rea standards and which, by implication, the addition of a “willfulness” requirement 
would correct, are quite telling in exposing just how extreme the Chamber’s concep-
tion of “willfulness” really is and what the impact of adopting such a standard in the 
FCPA would entail. For example, the Chamber strongly criticized the separate charges 
brought in the Siemens case against a Bangladeshi subsidiary of Siemens (“Siemens 
Bangladesh”) as evidence of the kind of unfairness and prosecutorial over-reaching 
which makes the addition of a “willfulness” standard to the FCPA for corporate crimi-
nal liability necessary.136 In particular, the Chamber Report suggests that prosecution 
of Siemens Bangladesh was inappropriate because all of the bribes were made by for-
eign entities outside the United States and Siemens Bangladesh did not know that 
making some of the bribes from U.S. bank accounts might subject it to liability under 
the FCPA.137 In fact, the DOJ charged and Siemens Bangladesh plead guilty to know-
ingly and intentionally making thirty-three illegal payments over the course of more 
than five years and amounting to more than $5,335,000 for the purpose of obtaining 
telecommunications business for other companies in the Siemens group.138 Moreover, 
the acts of Siemens Bangladesh were part of a pattern of bribery that, according to the 
DOJ, “was unprecedented in scale and geographic reach” involving “more than $1.4 
billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and 
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the Americas.”139 As it can hardly be asserted under these facts that either Siemens or 
Siemens Bangladesh did not know that their sustained and pervasive pattern of bribery 
together with their systematic efforts to falsify corporate records to hide their bribery 
was wrongful and in violation of law (the current standard of mens rea and “willfulness” 
required under the FCPA), it becomes clear that the Chamber’s proposed addition of 
“willfulness” could only be meant to require that Siemens and Siemens Bangladesh 
would have to know and intend for their conduct to violate the specific provisions of the 
FCPA to be subject to liability. In other words, the Chamber’s proposed “willfulness” 
standard would insulate Siemens Bangladesh from criminal responsibility for its long-
standing, pervasive, knowing and intentionally unlawful acts of bribery merely because 
it did not have specific knowledge that making bribes from U.S. bank accounts would 
violate provisions of the FCPA. Seen in this light, the Chamber’s proposal looks much 
more like a license to commit pervasive and intentional bribery with impunity rather 
than a modest attempt to eliminate the unfairness to corporations of the risk of possible 
prosecutorial over-reach. 
The Chamber’s Report also singled out the BAE case as evidence of “[t]he gov-
ernment’s increasingly broad interpretation of the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA” in 
its discussion of the need for a “willfulness” standard.140 In BAE, BAE Systems plc, a 
U.K. corporation, plead guilty “to conspiring to defraud the United States by impairing 
and impeding its lawful functions, to make false statements about its Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (FCPA) compliance program, and to violate the Arms Export Control 
Act (AECA) and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)” which false state-
ments and failures to make disclosure to the U.S. government resulted in more than 
$200 million in ill-gotten gains to BAE.141 The Chamber Report suggests that the basis 
for charges in BAE “was the possible use of U.S. bank accounts to make improper 
payments,” which, in the context of a discussion of the “willfulness” standard must 
be meant to imply, as with Siemens Bangladesh, that it was unfair to prosecute BAE 
because it did not specifically know that making such payments from the U.S. would 
violate the FCPA.142 In fact, the charges in relation to the FCPA to which BAE plead 
guilty in the BAE case did not involve the unlawful payments themselves. Rather, BAE 
“knowingly and willfully failed to create sufficient compliance mechanisms to prevent 
and detect violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA” while making knowing 
and willful false statements to the U.S. government to the contrary.143 
The Chamber’s mischaracterization of the BAE case is instructive of its intention 
with regard its proposed “willfulness” standard. Since BAE was charged for and actually 
pleaded guilty to “knowingly and willfully making false statements to U.S. government 
agencies,” the “willfulness” standard the Chamber is proposing must be more strict 
than the one applied in BAE if the addition of such standard would have an impact on 
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the ability of the United States to prosecute companies such as BAE on similar facts in 
the future. Moreover, if the addition of the Chamber’s strict “willfulness” standard to 
the FCPA would limit the DOJ and the SEC from investigating and prosecuting per-
vasive and systematic corporate corruption on the scale evidenced in the Siemens and 
BAE cases, the Chamber’s proposed amendment can only be understood as an attempt 
to significantly circumscribe the scope of the FCPA and restrict the ability of the U.S. 
government to fight even the most extreme cases of corporate corruption. Once again, 
far from limiting the unfairness to corporations of unreasonable exercises of prosecu-
torial discretion, the Chamber’s proposal looks more like a license to bribe with impu-
nity even in cases where there is no question as to a company’s intention to bribe and 
knowledge that its acts were wrongful or unlawful merely because the company did not 
also know it was violating the specific provisions of the FCPA. 
Taken on its own, the primary beneficiaries of the Chamber’s proposed “willful-
ness” amendment would seem to be foreign corporations, like Siemens and BAE, that 
might be less likely to know the specific provisions of the FCPA than U.S. companies. 
When read together with the Chamber’s other proposed FCPA amendments including 
the elimination of successor liability and liability for the acts of subsidiaries, the Cham-
ber’s broader agenda of significantly limiting the scope and efficacy of the FCPA with 
respect to both U.S. and foreign corporations becomes apparent. 
4. Proposed Amendment: Eliminating a Parent 
 Company’s Civil Liability under the FCPA for the 
 Unlawful Acts of Its Subsidiary
 Eliminating the risk of civil liability would substantially decrease the 
incentives for parent company to oversee FCPA compliance by their 
foreign subsidiaries 
Just as the potential for successor corporate criminal liability provides an important 
incentive for an acquiring company to undertake thorough due diligence, the poten-
tial for a corporate parent to be held civilly liable for FCPA violations carried out by 
its subsidiaries provides a critical mechanism for incentivizing parent companies to 
adopt and effectively implement a group-wide anti-corruption compliance program. 
Such programs are designed to prevent FCPA violations by their controlled subsidiaries 
before such violations occur and to promptly detect, disclose and eliminate such viola-
tions that do occur. There is no doubt that Congress was aware when it adopted the 
FCPA that companies frequently use foreign subsidiaries to make corrupt payments to 
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foreign officials. As the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce noted 
in discussing the bill that came to be the FCPA:
The committee found it appropriate to extend the coverage of the bill to non-U.S. 
based subsidiaries because of the extensive use of such entities as a conduit for 
questionable and improper conduct. The committee believes this extension of 
U.S. jurisdiction to so-called foreign subsidiaries is necessary if the legislation is 
to be an effective deterrent to foreign bribery. Failure to include such subsidiaries 
would only create a massive loophole in this legislative scheme through which 
millions of bribery dollars will continue to flow.144
While the FCPA as finally adopted in 1977 did not extend direct liability to foreign 
subsidiaries, the House-Senate Conference in discussing the final Act made clear that 
a U.S. parent company, whether an issuer or a domestic concern under the Act, would 
remain liable for corrupt payments made indirectly through its foreign subsidiary.145 As 
has been repeatedly stated, the predicate for liability under the anti-bribery provisions of 
the FCPA is “knowledge” and “corrupt” intent. In adopting a definition of “knowledge” in 
the 1988 amendments to the FCPA that eliminated liability for violations by subsidiaries 
about which it had “reason to know” while retaining a parent company’s liability for “con-
scious disregard” or “deliberate ignorance” of the unlawful activity of its subsidiaries,146 
Congress meant to address the “head-in-the-sand problem” to ensure that
Management officials could not take refuge from the Act’s prohibitions by their 
unwarranted obliviousness to any action (or inaction), language or other “sig-
naling” device that should reasonably alert them of the “high probability” of an 
FCPA violation.147
Through these mechanisms, Congress preserved an incentive for parent compa-
nies to monitor and secure compliance by their foreign subsidiaries while seeking to 
protect parent companies from strict liability for violations by subsidiaries conducted 
wholly independently and without the parent’s knowledge or tacit acquiescence.
In the accounting and controls provisions of the FCPA Congress expressed a simi-
lar intent to require that parent companies remain vigilant over the acts of their sub-
sidiaries. As the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs explained,
a U.S. company which “looks the other way” in order to be able to raise the 
defense that they were ignorant of bribes made by a foreign subsidiary, could 
be in violation of [15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(b)(2)] requiring companies to devise and 
maintain adequate accounting controls. Under the accounting section no off-the-
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books accounting fund could be lawfully maintained, either by a U.S. parent or 
by a foreign subsidiary, and no improper payment could be lawfully disguised.148
Significantly, Congress chose to hold parent companies liable for even unknow-
ing violations of the books and records and accounting and control provisions of the 
FCPA by their foreign subsidiaries in recognition of the fact that without the prospect 
of such liability, the temptation for parent companies to “look the other way” might be 
too great.149
It is in this context that the Chamber’s proposal to amend the FCPA to limit a 
parent company’s civil liability for the acts of a subsidiary must be assessed. It seems 
clear that Congress has repeatedly refused to eliminate liability of parent companies for 
FCPA violations conducted through subsidiaries in recognition of the fact that doing 
so would effectively insulate the vast bulk of foreign bribery from the reach of the Act. 
On the other hand, the Chamber is correct in suggesting that if the FCPA permitted a 
parent corporation to be liable for an act of bribery by a subsidiary of which it had no 
knowledge and in which it did not participate or acquiesce through “conscious disre-
gard” or “deliberate ignorance” would eviscerate the knowledge and intent requirements 
of the Act. 
The FCPA seeks to achieve a delicate balance between these two extremes whereby 
under the books and records and accounting and controls provisions of the Act a par-
ent corporation is obligated to ensure that the books and records of its subsidiaries 
accurately reflect the disposition of corporate assets, including, if applicable, corrupt 
payments to foreign officials. If the parent consciously or deliberately fails to take any 
action to ensure proper and accurate reporting by its subsidiaries in accordance with 
the books and records and accounting and control provisions of the FCPA, to inves-
tigate “red flags” that might reasonably alert it to potential unlawful behavior by its 
subsidiaries or to take appropriate steps to eliminate corrupt payments being made by 
a subsidiary of which it becomes aware through such reporting, it may give rise to a 
reasonable inference that the parent indirectly participated in the subsidiary’s acts of 
bribery through its knowing acquiescence, conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance 
of its subsidiary’s unlawful actions.150 It is important to note that in such a circum-
stance, it is the parent’s conscious acquiescence in the unlawful acts of its subsidiary 
through a deliberate failure of oversight that gives rise to its potential liability under 
the Act and not the acts of the subsidiary alone. Moreover, it would still be incumbent 
upon the government to establish that the parent’s failures and omissions were both 
knowing and corruptly undertaken in order for liability to attach under the anti-bribery 
provisions (as opposed to the books and records and controls provisions) of the Act.
While the Chamber’s Report asserts that the SEC “routinely charges parent com-
panies with civil violations of the anti-bribery provisions based on actions taken by 
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foreign subsidiaries of which the parent is entirely ignorant,” it supports this assertion 
with only two case examples,151 neither of which justifies the disturbance of the bal-
anced framework of “carrot” and “stick” incentives created by Congress in the FCPA 
to induce parent companies to secure the compliance of their foreign subsidiaries that 
would result if the Chamber’s proposed amendment on parent/subsidiary liability were 
adopted.152
In the first case, In the Matter of United Industrial Corporation (“UIC”), the SEC 
charged UIC, a defense contractor, with violations of the books and records, the controls 
and the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA in connection with a scheme of bribery 
undertaken by Thomas Wurzel, the CEO of one of UIC’s subsidiaries, to secure defense 
business for UIC in connection with a military aircraft depot in Cairo, Egypt.153 The SEC 
also brought a separate enforcement action against Thomas Wurzel directly for viola-
tions of the FCPA.154 The SEC’s allegations supporting UIC’s culpability under the Act 
included (i) a lack of meaningful controls to prevent or detect Wurzel’s illegal conduct, 
(ii) approval by UIC’s legal department of its subsidiary’s retention of the Egyptian agent 
through which the bribes were made without any due diligence and on the basis of a 
contract which did not comply with UIC’s stated FCPA compliance policy, (iii) approval 
by a UIC official of at least one substantial payment to the agent without investigation 
as to the purposes of the payment, (iv) the substantial financial benefit to UIC of the 
unlawful conduct and (v) the fact that Thomas Wurzel had a direct reporting line to 
UIC’s CEO and that UIC routinely listed Wurzel in its Forms 10-K and annual reports 
as “senior management” of UIC.155 
In the second case, In the Matter of Diagnostic Products Corporation (DPC), the SEC 
charged DPC, a producer and seller of diagnostic medical equipment, with violations of 
the books and records, controls and anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA in respect of 
a scheme of bribery conducted over an 11-year period involving improper commission 
payments made by a subsidiary of DPC to doctors and laboratory employees who con-
trolled purchasing decisions at state-owned hospitals in China.156 A separate DOJ action 
was brought directly against DPC’s subsidiary DPC (Tianjin) Co. for FCPA violations for 
the same bribery scheme.157 While the Cease and Desist Order acknowledges that DPC 
did not become directly aware of the unlawful payments until November 2002 when 
accountants alerted it to Chinese tax issues with respect to the payments, there is some 
implication that the company’s failure to discover unlawful payments frequently paid 
in cash and consistently made over a period of 11 years could give rise to an inference 
of a deliberate lack of adequate controls or a “conscious disregard” of unlawful activity 
by its subsidiary.
Whether the charges brought by the SEC in the UIC or the DPC cases would have 
been sustained at trial is a matter of conjecture that only court action could definitively 
resolve. Nevertheless, attention to these cases reveals a number of important things. 
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First, the remedies undertaken in both cases could have been sustained under the 
books and records and adequate controls provisions of the FCPA regardless of any 
alleged violation of the anti-bribery provisions.158 Hence, it is unclear from these cases 
whether the anti-bribery charges were a significant basis for the SEC’s action or merely 
a make-weight addition to a complaint based primarily on the books and records and 
controls provisions that the Chamber concedes contemplate liability for violations of 
foreign subsidiaries regardless of knowledge or intent by the corporate parent. Second, 
in both cases, the SEC articulates a colorable claim that the parent company participated 
or knowingly acquiesced in the unlawful bribery scheme of its subsidiary, giving rise 
to possible liability under the anti-bribery provisions of the Act.159 Third, had the cases 
gone to trial, or had the defendant parent companies chosen to challenge the SEC 
action, the SEC would have been required to establish that the parent’s acts and omis-
sions met both the knowledge and the corrupt intent requirements of the Act in order 
to subject the parent companies to liability under the Act. Finally, the remedies pursued 
by the SEC in both cases—an undertaking to cease and desist from further violations of 
the Act and disgorgement of the profits gained as a result of the unlawful bribes—sug-
gest the SEC’s intention to induce the parent to secure compliance with the FCPA by it 
and its subsidiaries rather than punishment of the parent’s behavior.160 
Despite the Chamber’s citation of both of these cases to exemplify the need to 
limit a parent company’s liability for the acts of its subsidiary, in neither case was the 
parent company subjected to any civil or criminal penalty or fine. Rather, in the case of 
DPC, a criminal penalty was levied by the DOJ against DPC’s subsidiary DPC (Tianjin) 
Ltd., and in the case of UIC, a civil penalty was leveled by the SEC against Thomas Wur-
zel, the CEO of UIC’s subsidiary, who instigated the bribery scheme.161 With respect to 
the parent companies, the SEC pursued the equitable remedy of “disgorgement” autho-
rized under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and used to divest wrong-doers of their 
ill-gotten gains and to induce compliance with the securities laws.162 Unlike a penalty, 
which is designed to punish, disgorgement is intended to prevent unjust enrichment 
by restoring the company to the financial position in which it would have been if the 
wrongdoing had not taken place.163
Taken together, these cases suggest an effort by the SEC and the DOJ to imple-
ment Congress’s dual mandate in the FCPA of inducing appropriate oversight by par-
ent corporations over the activities of their subsidiaries, while permitting enforcement 
actions to be brought against parent companies in circumstances where there is reason 
to suspect that the parent may be violating the FCPA through the use of its foreign 
subsidiaries. While reasonable people might differ on whether the exercise of prosecuto-
rial discretion under the FCPA in any particular case is appropriate, absent a showing 
of persistent prosecutorial abuse, it is most appropriate to leave the resolution of any 
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such cases which might arise in future to the courts, rather than making a fundamental 
legislative change to the architecture of the FCPA. In this regard, the fact that large, 
multinational corporations such as UIC and DPC chose to settle rather than challenge 
the SEC’s charges under the FCPA may be a reflection of the companies’ recogni-
tion of the colorable nature of those charges and the substantial risk of a judgment of 
additional liability at trial.164 In any event, the Chamber has failed to establish that the 
speculative and unsubstantiated risk of civil liability by parent companies for the wholly 
independent acts of their subsidiaries outweighs the substantial risk, long recognized 
by Congress, that insulating parent companies from all liability for bribery undertaken 
by their foreign subsidiaries “would only create a massive loophole in this legislative 
scheme through which millions of bribery dollars will continue to flow.”165 Faced with 
such unequal risks, the prudent course for Congress would be to preserve the FCPA in 
its current form with respect to parent/subsidiary liability. 
5. Proposed Amendment: Narrowing the Statutory 
 Definition of “Foreign Official”
 Public control over commercial enterprise varies greatly in different 
contexts and different countries, thus legislative clarification would 
be both over and under inclusive
As the Chamber correctly notes, not all knowing and corrupt payments intended to 
result in an undue advantage are prohibited by the FCPA. The FCPA, unlike anticor-
ruption statutes in many other countries, does not prohibit bribery of private actors. 
The Act focuses on the knowing, intentional and corrupt bribery of foreign government 
officials, either directly or indirectly, for the purpose of exercising inappropriate influ-
ence on government policy or obtaining improper business advantage from a foreign 
government. This reflects the intention of Congress when it enacted the FCPA to focus 
on the harm done to our economy and to our foreign policy interests by the practice 
of bribing foreign governments.166 The FCPA’s definition of “foreign official” must be 
read in the context of the statute as a whole.
Accordingly, the FCPA limits the scope of the act in several crucial ways. As we 
have seen, the FCPA sets a high standard for mens rea, unlike the national anti-corrup-
tion statutes in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Only payments made knowingly, 
intentionally, and corruptly are prohibited. Moreover, the purpose of the bribe must 
relate to the exercise of public authority. Specifically, the FCPA prohibits bribes directed 
to “foreign officials” for the purpose of
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 “(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official 
capacity, 
  (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of 
the lawful duty of such official, or 
  (iii) securing any improper advantage; or 
 (B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign govern-
ment or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of 
such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer in obtain-
ing or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.”167
The Act also prohibits payments made to 
“any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value 
will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, 
to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign 
political office, for purposes of
 “(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, political party, 
party official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, (ii) inducing 
such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate to do or 
omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such foreign official, 
political party, party official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper 
advantage; or
 (B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate to 
use his or its influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof 
to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumen-
tality, in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or 
with, or directly business to, any person.”168
The Act clearly exempts “facilitating or expediting payment[s] to a foreign offi-
cial, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the 
performance of a routine governmental action”169 and provides an affirmative defense 
for payments which were “lawful under the written laws and regulations” of the for-
eign country whose officials received the payments and for “reasonable and bona fide 
expenditure[s], such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign 
official, party, party official, or candidate and was directly related to (A) the promotion, 
demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution or perfor-
mance of a contract with a foreign government or agency thereof.”170 
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The FCPA’s definition of “foreign official,” tracks the approach taken by mul-
tilateral anti-corruption treaties and by the national statutes of other jurisdictions. In 
one way or another, all define “foreign official” broadly enough to permit appropriate 
administrative and prosecutorial discretion aimed at implementing the larger purpose 
of the legislation: prohibiting corrupt and illegal payments by people and organiza-
tions intended to improperly influence foreign government decision-making. The FCPA 
focuses on the nature of the entity to whom corrupt payments are made, prohibiting 
bribes directed to “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, 
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization or any per-
son acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, 
agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organiza-
tion.”171 The OECD defines “foreign public official” as
any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign 
country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public function 
for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any 
official or agent of a public international organization.172
The United Kingdom focuses more directly on the function being performed than 
on the nature of the entity concerned, defining a foreign official in terms of the exercise 
of a “public function” on behalf of a country or territory outside the UK, a public agency, 
public enterprise, or public international organization,173 including “officers exercising 
public functions in state-owned enterprises.”174 In each of these cases, the definition 
is broad enough to permit interpretation in light of changing circumstances and the 
diverse forms through which public authority is exercised across the world.175
More importantly, the developing trend is towards the criminalization of private 
commercial as well as public bribery, rendering it less important to determine with 
precision the class of persons to whom it is permissible to offer corrupt payments. 
Indeed, with the rise of national statutes applicable to both public and private bribery, 
it would be a risky compliance strategy for a business entity to focus its global compli-
ance program on the classification of the beneficiaries of the corruption. This trend is 
visible in national statutes in the UK and elsewhere, as well as in the OAS treaty—to 
which the U.S. is a signatory.176 
The Chamber describes the potential prosecutorial reach of the FCPA in alarm-
ing terms. The hypothetical scenarios they sketch would indeed be alarming if the other 
limitations in the Act were disregarded. What, they ask, about a paying a speaking fee to 
a foreign professor who works for a public university? Might a company face liability for 
making payments to any commercial entity with substantial public ownership, such as 
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a foreign version of General Motors or A.I.G? The correct answer may well be yes if all 
of the requirements under the Act are satisfied. That is, if the payment to the professor 
was (i) unlawful under the law of the country involved, (ii) unable to qualify as a routine 
facilitative or expediting payment, and (iii) knowingly, intentionally and corruptly made 
for the prohibited purpose of influencing official action to obtain a business advan-
tage. A similar analysis would apply in the case of a foreign commercial entity with 
substantial public ownership. Bribes knowingly and corruptly paid to such an entity 
for the prohibited purpose improperly influencing government decision-making for 
business advantage in violation of local law in circumstances which are neither routine 
nor reasonable and bona fide expenditures would be prohibited. But, when expressed in 
context, this hardly seems an example of unfairness to the corporate actors involved. As 
the Chamber acknowledges, case law has already begun to give guidance on the range 
of entities which may improperly influence official policy if offered corrupt payments 
for these prohibited purposes.177
The Chamber specifically proposes to restrict the scope of the FCPA by adopting 
a formal definition limiting the meaning of “instrumentality of a foreign government” 
to entities with a specific level of government ownership and restricting the meaning of 
“foreign official” to persons with a specific rank. Doing so would frustrate the purpose 
of the Act—and it would not benefit business which would continue to be subject to the 
much the broader functional definitions included in other national statutes. In a world 
which organizes public authority in a large variety of ways, drafting a rule arbitrarily 
limiting the types of foreign public “instrumentalities” to which the FCPA applies would 
seriously compromise the purpose of the Act to prevent intentional bribery which cor-
rupts foreign officials and official decision-making. Because public authority is arranged 
very differently in different countries, entities controlled by the government, owned by 
the government, or associated with members of a foreign government may sometimes 
be more important in setting official policy than some official bodies. It is for this 
reason that the Act clearly includes payments to “any person,” whether that person is 
or is not an “official” which are made for the purpose of corrupting official decision-
making. Since the contours of public control over commercial life vary greatly in differ-
ent cultural contexts, any legislative clarification would be destined to be both over- and 
under-inclusive. This is precisely the type of issue best left to sound administrative 
management and judicial review.  
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IV. Conclusion: The Way Forward 
 for American Leadership
Congress enacted the FCPA in the wake of the Watergate scandal after an SEC investiga-
tion revealed that American firms had paid over $300 million in questionable payments 
to foreign government officials.178 Congress felt that these events tarnished the image 
of the US abroad and impaired confidence in the financial integrity of American corpo-
rations.179 The America business community agreed. Bans on bribery, they felt, would 
improve the climate and culture of international business. The American foreign policy 
community was equally concerned that illegal political contributions to foreign govern-
ments and transnational bribery by some American firms threatened to undermine 
foreign governments and hinder the lawful pursuit of U.S. business interests abroad. 
The resulting statute set a worldwide example and inaugurated a global campaign to 
eliminate corruption in transnational business. 
More than thirty years later, corruption has never been more stigmatized glob-
ally. Governments everywhere have adopted strong statutes prohibiting bribery and 
corruption. By supporting multilateral standard setting, harnessing the extraterritorial 
reach of the FCPA to hold foreign companies accountable, and cooperating with foreign 
enforcement agencies, the United States continues to make a powerful contribution to 
transforming global business culture. The private sector has responded by developing 
powerful practices of compliance and internal monitoring. The result is a more open 
and reliable climate for international economic activity. It is easier for enterprises to 
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resist demands for corrupt payments. Off the shelf compliance programs are available 
to strengthen internal controls by businesses of all sizes. It is easier for foreign govern-
ments to discipline their own officials where enterprises operating in their jurisdiction 
are prohibited from making bribes and required to maintain records demonstrating that 
they have not done so. The global campaign against corruption has not been a constraint 
on American economic performance—quite the opposite. It has improved the climate 
for global business and made it easier for American firms to participate in the global 
economy on an equal footing. 
As the global campaign turns towards strengthened enforcement and the admin-
istrative routinization of anti-corruption commitments, it will be particularly important 
for American authorities, led by the DOJ and the SEC, to retain their traditional flex-
ibility, their commitment to a level playing field, and their emphasis on private sector 
compliance and monitoring as the most effective tools in the battle against corruption. 
The Chamber’s misleading rhetoric notwithstanding, the global trends are all good, the 
FCPA is working and new legislation is not necessary.
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U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/422. 
66. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Art. 46 & Chpt. V, Oct. 31, 2003, G.A. Res. 
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(2010) c.23; Corruption of Public Officials, S.C. 1998, c.34, respectively. Moreover, China, India, Rus-
sia and Singapore, although not members of the OECD, have also adopted anti-bribery statutes, 
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70. Michael Fine, Coordinating UK Bribery Act & FCPA Compliance, 9 LRN’S ETHICS & COMPLI-
ANCE ALLIANCE (2010-11). Issuers and domestic concerns may be held liable under the FCPA for acts 
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§§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a). For acts taken outside the United States, U.S. issuers and domestic concerns 
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national Business Transactions, Belgium, Phase 2 Report, Recommendation 4.c (2005), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/document/45/0,3746,en_2649_34859_44570477_1_1_1_1,00.html. Other 
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oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
74. Bribery Act (2010) §12, c.23, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/sec-
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bribery, creating offenses for both the purveyor and the recipient of any benefit or advantage. See, 
South Africa, Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (2004) §3 (Act 12 of 2004) and United 
Kingdom Bribery Act (2010) §§ 1, 2, c.23. According to the OECD, the Italian law implementing 
the OECD Convention amended the Criminal Code by creating two new offences: the offence of 
bribery of foreign public officials and the passive bribery offence for officials of the European Com-
munities. As the OECD discussed, however, the existing provisions of the Italian Criminal Code 
already included penalties for domestic public officials for passive bribery. OECD Working Group 
on Bribery in International Business Transactions, Italy: Phase 1: Review of Implementation of the 
Convention and 1997 Recommendation, at 2-3, 5 (May 16, 2011).
77. Bribery Act (2010) §§ 1–5, c.23. Notably, the UK statute goes well beyond the FCPA to crimi-
nalize private as well as public sector bribery—penalizing bribery of “a person,” rather than only 
“foreign public officials.” 
78. The statute provides an exception for “any facilitating or expediting payment . . . the purpose 
of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action.” Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b). A “routine governmental action,” is “only an 
action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official.” Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(A). See also, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 
78dd-1(f)(3)(B).
79. For example, comments by the Australian government on the bribery provisions of their 
criminal code indicate that their facilitation payments defense was based on the FCPA. Australia’s 
code permits a defense based on facilitation payments if all of the following conditions are met: 
(1) the benefit was minor; (2) the behavior that the benefit was given to obtain was minor, routine 
and non-discretionary; (3) there was a record made of the conduct (which included the value, of the 
benefit, the date, the identity of the foreign public official, the particular action that was expedited, 
and a signature); and (4) the record has been retained, or lost or destroyed by other circumstances; 
or the prosecution took place seven years after the conduct. Australia Criminal Code Amendment 
(Bribery of Foreign Officials) Act 1999, § 70.4 (1–2) (No. 43 of 1999). 
80. Richard Alderman, Director of the UK Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) has clarified that while 
companies need not expect that as of July 1, 2011 as the Bribery Act Comes into force, the SFO will 
immediately prosecute every company providing facilitation payments, the statute is meant to move 
companies toward a “zero tolerance” position on such expenditures. Alderman also stated that “cor-
porations should come and talk to the SFO about these issues so that we can understand that their 
commitment is real. This also gives the corporate the opportunity to talk to us about the problems 
that they face in carrying on business in the areas in which they trade. It is important for us to know 
this in order to discuss with the corporate what is a sensible process.” Alderman stated that the fol-
lowing approach, authored by UK attorneys on thebriberyact.com fairly reflected the UK approach 
to these payments: “The SFO have informed us that when considering the activities of a company 
which continues to make small facilitation payments after 1 July 2011, the SFO will be looking to 
see: (1) whether the company has a clear issued policy regarding such payments; (2) whether writ-
ten guidance is available to relevant employees as to the procedure they should follow when asked 
to make such payments; (3) whether such procedures are being followed by employees; (4) if there 
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proper action (collective or otherwise) is being taken to inform the appropriate authorities in the 
countries concerned that such payments are being demanded; (6) whether the company is taking 
what practical steps it can to curtail the making of such payments. If the answers to these questions 
are satisfactory then the corporate should be shielded from prosecution.” Quoted in: http://thebrib-
eryact.com/2011/06/21/facilitation-payments-sfo-endorse-sfo-thebriberyact-com-six-step-solution/.
81. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c), -1(f )(3); 78dd-2(c), -2(h)(4); 
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of Justice, DOJ Opinion Procedure No. 07-01, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/opinion/2007/0701.pdf. See also, U.S. Dept. of Justice, DOJ Opinion Procedure No. 07–02, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2007/0702.pdf.
82. Nevertheless, the UK Guidance from the Ministry of Justice has clarified that the Govern-
ment will weigh the decision to investigate such expenditures in light of the intent and the potential 
public interest served by prosecution For example, in the case of a hospitality payment, “the pros-
ecution would need to show that the hospitality was intended to induce conduct that amounts to 
a breach of an expectation that a person will act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a 
position of trust. This would be judged by what a reasonable person in the UK thought.” UK MOJ, 
Bribery Act of 2010 Guidance, at 10, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/bribery-
act-2010-guidance.pdf.
83. Bribery Act (2010) § 7, c.23; and Italian Lgs. Decree no. 231/2001, Art. 5,7. 
84. OECD, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: National Implementing Legislation, http://www.oecd.
org/document/30/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_1,00.html.
85. See Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977, H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 
at 1-2 (Sept., 28, 1977); Lanny Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, speaking at the 22nd National 
Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 17, 2009) at 6.
86. See OECD, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: National Implementing Legislation, http://www.
oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_1,00.html.
87. “[O]ver the last five years, more than half of the corporate FCPA resolutions have involved 
foreign companies or U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies.” Greg Andres, Acting Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney General, Statement Before Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, 
Washington, D.C., Nov. 30, 2010, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/testimony/2010/
crm-testimony-101130.html.
88. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq. See also, Written Tes-
timony of Michael B. Mukasey, on behalf of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, to the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 
at 15, Jun. 14, 2011, acknowledging that the statutory language of the FCPA requires “evidence of 
knowledge and intent for liability.” 
89. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(a) and (b). 
90. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Lay-Persons Guide to FCPA, available at http://www.justice.gov/crimi-
nal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf (last visited July 31, 2011).
91. H.R. Rep. No. 100–576, at 920 (1988) (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 1547, 1951, emphasis added.
92. U.K. Bribery Act (2010) §§ 7 and 8, c.23. See also, UK MOJ, Bribery Act of 2010 Guidance, at 
8, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf. 
93. Compare U.K. Bribery Act (2010) §§ 6 and 14, c.23 (bribery of foreign persons and the require-
ment of “consent or connivance” for liability of bodies corporate) with §§ 7 and 8 (failure to prevent 
a bribe by associated persons). See also, U.K. Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act of 2010—Guidance, 
Mar., 2011, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf, at 
8–9.
94. See Italian Lgs. Decree No. 231/2001, “Administrative Liability of Legal Persons,” Art. 5, 
quoted in Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, Italy: Phase 2 Report, 
55–56 (Nov. 29, 2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/36/38313133.pdf.
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org/dataoecd/30/36/38313133.pdf. Effective implementation of a compliance program “suitable to 
prevent crimes of the same sort as the one committed” excludes corporate liability on the grounds 
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“based on the principle that the company did not exercise due care in the supervision, selection, etc. 
of an officer or employee to prevent the culpable act. The burden rests on the legal person to prove 
that due care was exercised. Where a legal person raises the defence, a person must be identified 
as having exercised due care, etc., and the court must determine whether it was exercised properly 
having regard to the nature of the legal person and the circumstances of the case.” OECD Working 
Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, Japan: Phase 1, at 7 (May 2002). Sum-
maries of these and other OECD countries’ “compliance-like” rules may be found in Mike Koehler, 
The Compliance Defense Around the World (June 30, 2011), available at http://www.corporatecompli-
anceinsights.com/2011/the-compliance-defense-around-the-world/.
99. See In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A 2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (setting forth stan-
dards of conduct for directors of Delaware corporations with regard to the establishment of report-
ing and compliance mechanisms sufficient to meet their fiduciary duty of oversight).
100. In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A 2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
101. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Ch. 8, Intro. (2010). 
102. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2010).
103. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2010).
 Effective Compliance and Ethics Program 
 (a) To have an effective compliance and ethics program, for purposes of subsection (f) of § 
8C2.5 (Culpability Score) and subsection (c)(1) of § 8D1.4 (Recommended Conditions of 
Probation—Organizations), an organization shall—
  (1) exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct; and 
  (2) otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a 
commitment to compliance with the law.
 Such compliance and ethics program shall be reasonably designed, implemented, and 
enforced so that the program is generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal 
conduct. The failure to prevent or detect the instant offense does not necessarily mean that 
the program is not generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.
 (b) Due diligence and the promotion of an organizational culture that encourages ethical 
conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law within the meaning of subsection 
(a) minimally require the following:
  (1) The organization shall establish standards and procedures to prevent and detect 
criminal conduct.
  (2) (A) The organization’s governing authority shall be knowledgeable about the content 
and operation of the compliance and ethics program and shall exercise reason-
able oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness of the compli-
ance and ethics program. 
   (B) High-level personnel of the organization shall ensure that the organization has an 
effective compliance and ethics program, as described in this guideline. Specific 
individual(s) within high-level personnel shall be assigned overall responsibility 
for the compliance and ethics program.
   (C) Specific individual(s) within the organization shall be delegated day-to-day opera-
tional responsibility for the compliance and ethics program. Individual(s) with 
operational responsibility shall report periodically to high-level personnel and, as 
appropriate, to the governing authority, or an appropriate subgroup of the govern-
ing authority, on the effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program. To carry 
out such operational responsibility, such individual(s) shall be given adequate 
resources, appropriate authority, and direct access to the governing authority or 
an appropriate subgroup of the governing authority.
  (3) The organization shall use reasonable efforts not to include within the substantial 
authority personnel of the organization any individual whom the organization knew, 
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or should have known through the exercise of due diligence, has engaged in illegal 
activities or other conduct inconsistent with an effective compliance and ethics 
program.
  (4) (A) The organization shall take reasonable steps to communicate periodically and in 
a practical manner its standards and procedures, and other aspects of the compli-
ance and ethics program, to the individuals referred to in subparagraph (B) by 
conducting effective training programs and otherwise disseminating information 
appropriate to such individuals’ respective roles and responsibilities.
   (B) The individuals referred to in subparagraph (A) are the members of the govern-
ing authority, high-level personnel, substantial authority personnel, the organiza-
tion’s employees, and, as appropriate, the organization’s agents.
  (5) The organization shall take reasonable steps—
   (A) to ensure that the organization’s compliance and ethics program is followed, 
including monitoring and auditing to detect criminal conduct;
   (B) to evaluate periodically the effectiveness of the organization’s compliance and 
ethics program; and
   (C) to have and publicize a system, which may include mechanisms that allow for 
anonymity or confidentiality, whereby the organization’s employees and agents 
may report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual criminal conduct with-
out fear of retaliation. 
  (6) The organization’s compliance and ethics program shall be promoted and enforced 
consistently throughout the organization through 
   (A) appropriate incentives to perform in accordance with the compliance and ethics 
program; and 
   (B) appropriate disciplinary measures for engaging in criminal conduct and for fail-
ing to take reasonable steps to prevent or detect criminal conduct.
  (7) After criminal conduct has been detected, the organization shall take reasonable 
steps to respond appropriately to the criminal conduct and to prevent further similar 
criminal conduct, including making any necessary modifications to the organiza-
tion’s compliance and ethics program. 
   (c) In implementing subsection (b), the organization shall periodically assess the 
risk of criminal conduct and shall take appropriate steps to design, implement, or 
modify each requirement set forth in subsection (b) to reduce the risk of criminal 
conduct identified through this process.
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